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by
Paul Leo Eckbo
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management on August 25,
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Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis describes a behavioral model of the international
petroleum market and presents the results from it. The purpose of this
study is to develop a framework for analysis of the implications of the
likely degree of non-competitive behavior to be observed in the inter-
national petroleum market. The focus of the model is on the market
strategies that may be pursued by the world's oil exporters on a joint
or an individual basis. The structure of the model is designed to com-
bine features of formal modelling and of informal "story-telling" in a
consistent framework. Such a structure requires a simulation type model.
The "stories" that are being told are constructed from cartel theory,
from the empirical evidence on previous commodity cartels, and from the
special characteristics of the individual oil exporters. The model
described is evolutionary in the sense that each exporter is assumed to
behave according to a set of decision rules which may reflect a competi-
tive market structure, a monopolistic market structure, or any combina-
tion of the two. The change of the decision rules being applied provides
for the evolution of the market price. An attempt has been made to
combine the merits of formal competitive and monopoly models with those
of the informal "story-telling" approach. The price- and quantity-paths
consistent with the various "stories" over the period from 1974 to 1990
are reported.
Thesis Supervisors: M. A. Adelman/H. D. Jacoby
Professor of Economics/Professor of Management
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The International Petroleum Market
The price of crude oil in the international petroleum market, the
imports/exports market, is determined in the same way as the price of any
other product, by demand, production costs, and the kind and the extent
of non-competitive behavior. What makes the current price of crude oil
interesting from a theoretic as well as an empirical point of view is
the unprecedented degree of non-competitive behavior that the current
price level represents. The current price is fifty times the marginal
production costs of the marginal source of petroleum, the Persian Gulf
producers (1). When the most important commodity in international trade
becomes subject to such a degree of non-competitive behavior, then the
repercussions for the world economy for both consumers and producers of
oil are many and complex. The need for a formal framework to analyze the
likely extent of non-competitive behavior was therefore being felt. This
effort was undertaken to provide such a formal framework.
For the purpose of analyzing the significance of non-competitive
behavior to be observed in the international petroleum market, the cir-
cumstance faced in this market may be summarized in the following way:
(1) There is a set of petroleum importing countries, dominated by
the industrialized economies of the U.S., Europe, and Japan. The net
demand of each of these countries for imported oil is deterimined by the
total energy demands of each of the countries, less the domestic supplies
available, and less imports of other fuels such as coal.
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(2) There is a fringe of petroleum exporters, which includes various
non-OPEC sources such as the producers of the North Sea, the USSR, and
China, and potentially other countries such as Mexico. In this group may
also be included some members of OPEC which have great needs for foreign
exchange and who are "expansionist" in their oil production policies,
such as Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria.
(3) There is a small group of Persian Gulf nations who are the "price
makers." This group includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others in the Gulf;
under some definitions it also may include Libya, Iran, and Venezuela.
These countries face a residual demand for world oil, which is the total
demand less that supplied by the fringe. The members of this group form
the active core of the oil exporters; their control over price involves
two parts: (1) the setting of the price itself, and (2) the control of
production, so it does not outstrip the residual world demand at that
price.
The members of OPEC controlled 90% of the international market in 1973
and 73.3% of the world's proven recoverable reserves of oil as indicated
in Table 1.1. Saudi Arabia alone controlled 23% of the imports/exports
market and almost 25% of the world's proven recoverable reserves in 1973,
the year the oil exporters were able to increase the average cost of
crude to the oil companies from a low of $1.62 to $9.25, as pointed out
in Table 2.1.
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The structure of the international petroleum market is oligopolistic,
and the exporters have been able to take advantage of the oligopolistic
structure to raise the price of oil. The world economy has suffered from
the most poisonous level of "oligopollution" ever experienced.
An oligopolistic market cannot be analyzed wi-th the confidence with
which a competitive market is analyzed. The fact that some exporters
have entered into an explicit agreement to limit competition for mutual
benefit, a cartel agreement, does not reduce the uncertainty associated
with the market solutions to emerge. We are faced with critical uncer-
tainty regarding the ability of the Persian Gulf states to restrict pro-
duction cooperatively, or the willingness of a single country to bear the
burden of output restraint, so as to support the price received by all of
the world's petroleum exporters. We also expect to observe deviations
from competitive behavior by the non-colluding exporters, the exporter
fringe. There is considerable uncertainty associated with the extent and
the effect of various fiscal and non-fiscal regulatory regimes on the rate
of production in non-OPEC countries like Canada, Norway, and the United
Kingdom. The future escalation of costs and the uncertainty with respect
to the total number and location of geological traps containing hydrocar-
bons in commercial quantities, as well as the future path of international
prices, render evaluations of the relationships between these policy para-
meters and the level of activity in non-OPEC countries extremely difficult.
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Table 1-1
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION AND PROVED RE
Producing Area million B/day
million B/day
Western Hemisphere 16,122
United States 9,225
Venezuela 3,370
Canada 1,750
Others 1,777
Western Europe 396
Middle East 21,337
Saudi Arabia 7,671
Iran 5,870
Kuwait 3,144
Iraq 1,960
Others 2,692
Africa 5,840
Libya 2,190
Nigeria 2,020
Algeria 1,020
Others 610
Asia-Pacific 2,275
Indonesia 1,330
Others 945
Comrunist Countries 9,780
USSR 8,400
China 1,000
Others 380
World Total 55,750
OPEC Members 30,837
OAPEC Members 18,400
percent
28 .9
16.5
6.0
3.1
3.3
0.7
38.3
13.8
10.5
5.6
3.5
4.8
10.5
3.9
3.6
1.8
1.1
4.1
2.4
1.7
17.5
15.1
1.8
0.7
100.0
55.3
33.0
SERVES, 1973 (ESTIMATED)
billion barrels
76.1
34.6
14.2
9.7
- 17.6
15.9
350.3
140.8
60.2
72.7
31 .2
45.4
67.6
25.6
19.9
7.4
14.7
15.9
10.8
5.1
42.0
34.6
7.4
567.8
416.3
299.8
Source: International Economic Reoort of the President
Transmitted to the U.S. Congress, FeDruary, 1974
1The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973
were Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. The members
of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries re Algeria,
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emir-
tes. Gabon has recently been granted full membership (July 1975).
percent
13.4
6.1
2.5
1.7
3.1
2.8
61.7
24.8
10.6
12.8
5.5
8.0
11.9
4.5
3.5
1.3
2.6
2.8
1.9
0.9
7.4
6.1
1.3
100.0
73.3
52.8
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A distinctive peculiarity of a mineral industry is the need to take
account of depletion. With any fixed stock of minerals, investment
requirements and unit costs increase as depletion proceeds - both be-
cause of the tendency to go from more to less accessible deposits and
because of the anticipation of higher future prices. On the other hand,
this latter tendency may be retarded and even drastically reversed by the
possibility of technological improvement or of discoveries of new
deposits.
1.2 Approach of the Study
Given the structure of the international petroleum market and the
critical uncertainties associated with the future development of this
market, two broad areas of analysis were defined:
(i) What is the likely future path of the residual world demand
faced by the key cartel members?
(ii) What is the likely behavior of this group under those demand
conditions, given what is known about the producers themselves
(reserves, production costs, resource needs, political goals,
etc.)?
The approach that was made to the analysis of these two issues will
emerge from a summary of the chapters of the thesis.
The contractual relationships between the oil companies and the
exporter countries reflect the degree of decision-making power that each
of the two parties enjoy and the interdependencies of the two parties.
-17-
To identify the location of decision-making power and the extent to
which the possession of this decision-making power has been used or
could be used to establish and/or to maintain a non-competitive price
level, a review was made of the contractual relationships as they have
evolved over time. Chapter Two summarizes the findings of this review.
There has been a number of commodity cartels in world trade. To
learn about OPEC by analogy, a review was made of the experience of some
previous international commodity cartels as reported in Chapter Three.
The experience of these cartels was coded to indicate central factors to
the operation of workable versus unworkable cartel agreements.
There is also an extensive literature on oligopolistic markets and
on cartels. This literature was searched for possible clues to the study
of this particular market, namely the international petroleum market.
Conventional oligopoly models do not, however, seem to be very useful
when studying particular markets. The conclusion of Chapter Four is that
a more detailed study, "story-telling," is needed to hypothesize which
coalitions are likely to emerge under the different circumstances the
exporters might face. The need to combine aspects of formal modelling
with informal "story-telling," makes a simulation model the most
ambitious approach that can be made to the analysis of a particular
oligopolistic market without sacrificing the empirical validity of the
analysis. The representation of the international petroleum market in
the model reflects the need to combine formal and informal modelling as
reported in Chapter Five. The focus of this representation is on the
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behavioral characteristics of the exporters. A set of decision-rules has
been defined for each of the exporters, and an explicit analytic expres-
sion for the market price consistent with each combination of exporter
decision rules has been derived. The evolution of combinations of
decision rules to be observed over time, and the resulting price- and
quantity-paths consistent with the evolution of these decision-rules are
determined by "story-telling." Cartel theory, the experience of previous
cartels, and the price-responsiveness of the consumer markets as well as
the special characteristics of the exporters as indicated in Chapter Six
are used to construct the "stories." The "stories" are told and the
results of the "story-telling" or of the model simulations are reported
in Chapter Seven.
A simulation model has consequently been constructed in response to
the need for a formal framework applicable to an analysis of the interna-
tional petroleum market. The operation of such a model corresponds to
the simultaneous solution of a set of time-dependent equations. The
simulation model is highly adaptable to changed or improved functional
inputs. That portion of the model that calculates demand for imports
can be linked up with anyone of several representations of exporter
fringe behavior and of likely cartel behavior. The structure of the
model is flexible enough to allow features of formal models to work with
informal "story-telling" to explore the extent of and the implications
of non-competitive market bhavior to be observed in the international
petroleum market in the years to come.
-19-
1.3 Studies of the International Petroleum Market
The lack of formal models relevant to a study of a particular oligo-
polistic market is reflected in the approach taken in the major studies
of the international petroleum market or of the world oil market. The
studies made of this market are mostly informal-studies of the "story-
telling" or the industrial organization type. More recent attempts to
introduce formal models have been made. To accomodate these models,
however, the oligopolistic structure is assumed to be replaceable with
either a perfectly competitive structure or a monopolistic structure.
The industrial organization type study of a market allows the
researcher to make snapshots of an industry from any angle. The rich-
ness of detail may be overwhelming, but if artfully sorted and put toge-
ther in a consistent framework, an industrial organization type study
may give a better understanding of a particular non-competitive market
than any collectionof formal models. An outstanding example of an art-
ful study of the international petroleum market, the imports/exports
market, in a larger world petroleum market context is Adelman [1]. The
underlying hypothesis of the study by Adelman as well as the more recent-
ly published study by Jacoby [5], is that of a convergence towards a per-
fectly competitive market. These studies provide evidence that a number
of markets that we include in the term "the world petroleum market," such
as transportation and refining, were already competitive, and that the
world petroleum market as a whole was actually converging against a com-
petitive market structure in the 1960's. Adelman in his study, however,
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pointed out the unexploited market power of the producer countries and
the instability that might result from this.
The evidence on an emerging competitive market and the need for
quantitative rather than qualitative conclusions induced Houthakker and
Kennedy [6,8] to construct a formal model as a competitive structure.
The inclusion of an exogenous export tax as done in their model is a
proxy for the level of monopoly rent to be collected by a producing
country, does not alter the competitive structure of the model. By
solving the model for any given, future year, assuming an export tax
level, the model provides projections of consumption, supply, and trade
flows for that year. The Houthakker/Kennedy model is thus similar in
kind to a number of other studies [4,9,11] that have focused on the com-
position of the future world energy market under various assumptions
about the price of crude oil in the Persian Gulf. Neither OECD, Ford
Foundation, nor FEA do, however, consider the world market as a problem
in cartel behavior. But these studies have made a significant contribu-
tion by evaluating some of the implications of OPEC pricing scenarios,
and thus have indicated the responsiveness of the world's oil/energy
markets to the price of crude oil in the Persian Gulf. A scaled-down
version of the price-responsiveness of the world's oil/energy markets as
indicated by the studies of OECD and FEA, has been used as a basis in
this study when determining some of the pricing strategies of the
producer countries.
-21-
Allocation of crude oil and petroleum products was the problem being
approached by the large LP-type models traditionally being formulated by
the oil companies. The Deam effort [3] and the forthcoming Rapportstudy
[10] exemplifies this tradition. The rigid structure of these models
makes an analysis of the uncertainties we face today within these models
difficult.
Some recent efforts have been made to consider oil price setting from
the producer countries' point of view. The model developed for the World
Bank's Energy Task Force by Blitzer, Meeraus, and Stoutjesdijk [2] simu-
lates the world oil market under a set of OPEC pricing strategies and
ranks the strategies according to some possible policy criterions. Kalymon
[7] has developed two models to compute the long-term., pricing strategies
for OPEC which maximize the total discounted value of oil reserve exploi-
tation for OPEC as a whole or for some sub-group, and to compute the
desirability of various market sharing mechanisms within OPEC to the
membership of OPEC.
The world bank model is informal in the sense that the world oil
market is simply extrapolated under an arbitrary set of pricing strate-.
gies, and the outcomes of these pricing strategies are ranked according
to how "likeable" they appear. Kalymon has developed a model of a mono-
polistic structure, which can be used to determine the "optimal" price-
path to the individual countries that are assumed to belong to the mono-
poly unit. The Kalymon approach is thus the extreme counterpart of the
Houthakker/Kennedy approach, the former assuming a given and unchange-
able monopoly structure, the latter a competitive structure.
-22-
In an oligopolistic market the price level may fall below the compe-
titive level, as has happened in price-wars, and also increase above the
monopoly level as in the case of a cartel exploiting its short-term mar-
ket power and the uncertainty associated with the emerging price level.
That is, if a cartel increases the price above a level considered to be
the monopoly level, the market may not respond to the whole price
increase because the market expects the price to come down, which implies
that the cartel may benefit from an "uncertainty premium." The fact that
a competitive structure as well as a monopolistic structure might emerge
from an oligopolistic market structure implies that a model designed to
understand the likely development of such a market, must be flexible
enough to change structure or price-behavior over time. The simulation
model of this study is designed to explore the implications of pricing
behavior reflecting ifferent market structures in various periods over
the simulation horizon. The model described here is evolutionary in the
sense that each exporter is assumed to behave according to a set of
decision rules which may reflect a competitive market structure, a mono-
polistic market structure, or any combination of the two. The change of
the decision rules being applied from period to period provide for dis-
continutities in the price path as we would expect in a cartel-dominated
market. An attempt to combine the merits of formal competitive and
monopoly models as well as the infor;al "story-telling" approach has
been made..
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CHAPTER 2
COMPANIES VERSUS EXPORTER GOVERNMENTS
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between the oil companies and the governments of the
exporting countries has changed dramatically over the last few years. A
major aspect of this change is the transfer of decision-maling power from
the oil companies to the exporter governments. When analysing a cartel-
like organization like OPEC it is essential to determine to which extent
the organization controls the instruments required to successfully operate
a cartel. In the following a review is made of the contractual relation-
ships between oil companies and producer countries as they have evolved
over time. The focus is on the location of the decision-making power and
the extent to which the exploitation of this decision-making power has been
used or could be used to establish and/or maintain a non-competitive price
level. The degree of decision-making power and the ability to use this
power will determine the longevity of OPEC as a cartel-like entity.
2.2 The Pioneering Period
When the oil companies began looking for oil in Latin America and the
Far East, these. areas were politically dominated by the industrial
countries of the west. No local petroleum expertise existed. Petroleum
was not considered to be an essential commodity. The industrial countries
were therefore often in a position to determine both who should be given
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the rights to explore for and produce oil and the terms on which these
activities were to be undertaken, the terms of the concession agreements.
The main characteristics of the earliest concession agreements (1901-
1951) were:
1. The large concession areas and the long duration of these con-
cessions.
2. The small number of concessionaires.
3. The homogeneity and simplicity of the concession conditions.
4. Royalties constituted the main financial compensation.
5. The modest financial compensation for the concession due to the
low value of crude oil and the limited need for it in the earlier
years as well as to the limited bargaining ability and bargaining
power of the prospective producer countries.
6. The slow development of the concession conditions.
The oil companies controlled completely all aspects of oil production
and pricing. The governments received a royalty usually stipulated as a
fixed nominal amount per ton lifted, and that was the extent of their
involvement in the petroleum industry.
The companies were able to exploit their control of production and of
marketing of oil. If we disregard the era of the Standard Oil monopoly,
the first collusive agreement covering the international market was made
in 1S28 [4]. In 1928, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Shell agreed to
maintain market shares in foreign markets and in the acquisition of
foreign oil interests, the "as is" - or "Achnacarry" - agreement. Jersey
was a spokesman for all American exporting companies, which at that time
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made serious attempts to form a U.S. Webb-Pomerene Export Association, a
device by which a group of U.S. firms may join their export activities
without violating U.S. antitrust legislation. As far as prices were
concerned the high costs of the marginal U.S. wells, including many
stripper wells, would determine prices everywhere in the world. Price
was supposed to be equal to the U.S. Gulf price plus frieght, regardless
of the actual origin of the oil.
The collaboration between American companies within the Webb-Pomerene
framework collapsed, however, in 1930. The failure was due to incomplete
coverage of all sources of supply in each particular market. In the U.S.
it was difficult to control output due to widespread ownership and anti-
trust. In Europe, Russian and Rumanian producers caused problems. There
was, however, no evidence of price warfare or retaliation following the
collapse of the agreement.
In 1930 a new agreement was signed with detailed penalties for over-
and under-trading. This agreement controlled the European markets even
if Russian and Rumanian producers still caused problems. In 1932 Rumania
entered into a tentative agreement. An attempt to incorporate the
Russians failed.
The 1930 "as is" was declared to be applicable to all countries out-
side the U.S. A "Draft of Principle" in 1934, of "Utmost Confidence,"
arming the arrangement with supply quotas, distribution quotas and fines
for over-trading extended formally the coverage of the agreement to the
whole world.
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The uncontrolled producers were in the U.S., Mexico, Russia, and
Rumania. The disruptive ability of this outside fringe was limited. As
early as 1952 the U.S. was a net importer, Mexico was unimportant, and
Russia and Rumania had disappeared behind the iron curtain. The non-com-
petitive price level previously established survived even if no formal
agreement is recorded beyond 1945 [4].
Before World War II the U.S. Gulf was the only area in which there was
to some extent free trade in crude oil. The notion of posted price origin-
ated from the fact that buyers of crude in the gulf area publicly stated
the prices at which they were willing to buy crude. The Gulf price, being
a proxy for the open market price, was used as a basis for determining the
price of curde being charged elsewhere. The posted price of crude oil in
the Middle East was determined by deducting transportation cost from the
port of departure to the U.S. Gulf from the posted price in the U.S. Gulf.
The posted price was also used as a tax-reference price. The companies
paid royalties and taxes on the basis of the posted price, even if the
price at which oil could be sold in the market place was below the posted
price, which has been the case since the early 1950's.
2.3 The Second Generation
The earlier concession agreements gave exclusive rights to the exploi-
tation of petroleum in enormous areas. These rights were given on terms
which appeared unfavorable to the producer countries when they became
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aware of the market value of their petroleum. The agreements created mono-
polies for the concessionaires, with the accompanying animosity which this
provoked. The agreements also tended to transfer a country's oil policy
making from the legal governmental powers to the oil companies. The tra-
ditional concessions, held almost exclusively by-the eight major inter-
national oil companies, were increasingly regarded as derogatory to the
national honor. In a world of rising nationalism the concession agree-
ments in their original form could not survive. In some countries the
concession regime was simply terminated by nationalization of the oil
industry. Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938. Iran followed
in 1951 [8]. The petroleum expertise available in the producing countries
was, however, very limited. A reasonable compromise between the emphasis
on national sovereignty and the efficiency of the oil operations was
therefore a revision of the existing concession agreements in favor of the
producing country.
With the exception of Venezuela no exporter country had developed
petroleum expertise by the end of World War II when the era of decoloniza-
tion began and the third world got an opportunity to increase cooperation
among themselves. Venezuela helped educate the producer countries by
organizing an exchange of information and views on aspects of the oil
industry and on oil policies. Venezuela also saw the opportunity for
increased revenues if the producer countries could bargain with the oil
companies on a joint rather than an individual basis. Vene:uela promoted
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vigorously these ideas during the 1950's. The Arab league which was formed
in 1945 to provide the Arab oil producing countries with a formal institu-
tional structure within which to develop further collaborative arrange-
ments [2], did not, however, mature to the point at which it could have
realistically taken over the oil industry.
It was the entering oil companies, the independents and the state oil
companies, and not the producer countries themselves that eventually took
the initiative to a revision of the earlier concession agreements. Vene-
zuela was the originator of many of the new contractual concepts that were
being introduced. The newcomers had to offer the host governments better
terms than the majors in the competition for access to crude oil supplies.
The non-competitive price level was sufficiently high to accomodate both
the higher share being paid to the producer countries and the independents'
required rate of return on capital invested.
This second generation of concession agreements has the following
characteristics:
1. The agreement is valid only for a well-defined limited area for
a limited period of time;
2. The agreement contains rules about relinquishment after the
expiration of certain periods of time;
3. The agreement is split into a reconnaissance and a production
phase;
4. An income tax of 50c is levied.
z. Higher royalties, often graded royalties. The calculation of
royalties is made explicit in the agreement. The principle of
royalty expensing is followed;
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6. Other fees are clearly defined and fixed;
7. Fixed rules for working programs and additional investments;
8. Detailed rules for the solving of disputes, prefixed rules
about arbitrage.
Table 2-2 indicates how royalty and income tax rates are used to
produce a government take, the producer governments' per barrel revenues.
The 50-50 profit-sharing principle established in this second genera-
tion of concession agreements increased substantially the revenues of the
producer countries. These agreements did not, however, give the producer
countries access to the decision-making bodies. Pricing and lifting-
schedules were still to be decided by the companies.
The entrance of new firms, in addition to increasing the bargaining
power of the exporter governments, also increased the level of competition
in the market place. The entering firms put a downward pressure on the
price of oil. After a ten year period of nominal price stability, the
difference between the posted price and the price at which oil could be
sold in the market increased in 1959 to the extent that the companies
unilaterally reduced the posted price, the tax reference price, and hence
decreased the government take. The producing countries opposed the
reduction, established OPES and fixed a posted price of $1.80 which was
5 cents above the previous level.
2.4 Participation
Venezuel.a was still in the lead when the companies reduced prices in
1959. When the companies unilaterally reduced prices for the second time
-30-
in August 1959, Venezuela convinced the other oil exporting countries, and
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was formed in September
1960. The exporting countries had demonstrated that their technical know-
ledge and skills as well as their power position enabled them to oppose
unilateral price reductions by the companies. The main objectives of OPEC
were to:
1. Assure a stabilization of oil prices in the international
crude oil market;
2. Bring about a coordination of oil policies in the member states;
3. Assure a stable income to the producer countries, and an effective,
economic, and continual flow of oil supplies to the consuming
countries, and a just rate of return on the oil companies'
invested capital.
OPEC managed to reverse the downward trend in nominal prices, but not
in real terms. The real tax-paid cost of crude decreased by 28 per cent in
the 1960's (assuming a "normal" rate of inflation of 4 per cent).
The entrance of new firms continued through the 1960's. In 1960, 21
independents were producing in the Middle East. In 1970, 54 independents
and 13 national oil companies in addition to the 8 majors were producing
in this area [3]. The "majors," however, still played the major role even
if decreasingly so. The share of the seven largest companies in non-U.S.,
non-Communist world oil production decreased from 87.1% in 1953 to 70.9%
in 1972 [].
The independents, having access to fewer sources of crude and being
financially weaker than the majors, were much more dependedn on each pro-
ducer country and thus also much more vulnerable to the actions of the
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individual producer countries. As the majors did not supply the independ-
ents with crude when the independents were cut off from their source by
some producer country, individual producer countries were able to obtain
considerable concessions from the independents. The concessions granted
by the independents were later used as a basis for negotiations with the
majors.
Again it was the vulnerability of the independents and the consumer
country controlled state companies that made these companies, rather than
the producer governments, introduce the contractual concepts that gave the
governments direct control over domestic oil operations, and a means by
which they could themselves participate in these operations. The Italian
state oil company ENI finalized the first "joint-venture" agreements with
government participation in 1957 with the state companies in Egypt and
Iran [8].
The characteristics of the typical "joint-venture"agreements with
government participation are:
1. The government's authority as a government and the government's
rights as a participant in the venture are clearly separated.
2. The "joint-venture" is assigned a concession on the same terms
as any other company. The government-controlled company thus
becomes a concessionaire through the "joint-venture."
3. The government-owned company is usually 100 percent owned by the
government.
4. As a rule, participation is on a 50-50 basis.
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5. The government-controlled company's risk is reduced through the
principle of "carried interest." This means that the foreign
company "carries" the interest of the government by assuming the
entire economic risk until commercial discoveries are made.
6. When commercial discoveries are made, the government-controlled
company generally has to pay in cash its part of the further
costs associated with the future development of production
facilities.
7. The government-controlled company takes out its share of the
production in crude and may then sell the crude back to its
partners or market the crude itself.
The government owned oil companies operating nationalized industries
did not have ready access to world markets. The Government Oil Refining
Administration was set up in Iraq as early as 1952. The Iraqi National
Oil Company was not formed until 1964 to engage in all aspects of the
industry, including sales overseas, later taking over exploration and
production under a nationalization programme. In the years following the
nationalization, the Iraqi oil industry stagnated, and it was not revived
until 1973, when an acgreement including compensation was reached with the
majors [8]. Iran had a similar experience following the nationalization
of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, a take-over that did not become a
reality until 1973, when a long-term supply agreement was reached with the
majors.
The lack of technical and managerial expertise in the exporting
countries proved to be costly in terms of reduced oil activities. The need
for assistance from the concessionary companies was therefore recognized.
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An effort was made to find a working relationship that could meet the
requirements of the private companies without involving an equity partici-
pation. Indonesia, after having nationalized the oil industry in 1960,
introduced production-sharing contracts in 1966. A production-sharing
contract entitles the companies to a fixed percentage of the crude oil
produced to recover their exploration and production costs. The formal
ownership of the reserves discovered is retained by the state company. A
politically explosive issue is thereby avoided. Politically neutral is
also the "service contract" or "entrepreneur contract" concept formulated
by Venezuela in 1959 and implemented for the first time in 1966 in an
agreement between the French state-owned company ERAP and Iran. Under
such an agreement the foreign oil company operates as a contractor for the
state-owned company. The discoveries made and the petroleum produced
remain the property of the state. The foreign oil company, the contractor,
will usually get no more than a long-term right to buy a pre-assigned
part of the produced crude at a discounted price. ERA?'s agreement with
Iran and Iraq in 1968 gave the company a long-term right to buy at a dis-
counted price. However, in the much more significant agreement in 1973
between the major Consortium companies in Iran and the National Iranian
Oil Company, NIOC, no discounts were granted.
Some of the major Persian Gulf producers (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi,
and Qatar), rather than announce nationalization of the oil industry,
purchased, "at a bargain price," [8] a 25 percent share in he concession-
ary companies in an agreement of January 1, 1973. The companies were
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compensated on the basis of the book value of their assets only. Because
none of the state companies was yet in a position to market oil on this
scale, the governments required the oil companies to buy back the oil the
governments obtained through the participation agreements at a price to be
determined by the governments. The buy-back price has been considerably
higher than the total tax paid cost of equity oil.
Since 1973 the governments' share of the production ventures has
increased rapidly. Kuwait recently announced a 100 per cent "participation"
which is in effect a complete nationalization of the industry [9]. The
other producers in the Gulf and Nigeria are expected to follow the example
soon. When the governments push for a 100 per cent interest in the operat-
ing companies, the price structure is likely to converge towards the buy-
back price which would then become the price of crude.
It is still somewhat unclear how the companies will be compensated in
the future, whether it will be through a discount on the price of crude, a
fee to perform under a service or a management contract, or some produc-
tion sharing arrangement. The producer countries will still need the
services of the international oil companies for a number of years.
2.5 Pricinq
The fast rising demand for imported oil in the latter half of the
1960's put a strain on the delivery system. The spot tanker rate increased
steadily from 1967. Tn May 1970 the trans-Arabian pipeline (Tapline) was
blocked by Syria [1]. The producing governments in North Africa exploited
-35-
their favorable location by demanding higher taxes. When the companies
refused to pay the higher tax, Libya restricted output to force the compan-
ies to agree to its demands. The companies rushed to the spot tanker
market to secure transportation from the Persian Gulf. The supply of
tanker transport is very inelastic in the short run when the industry is
already operating at capacity. The spot market rate consequently jumped
dramatically, and the companies found it economically justified to agree
to the Libyan tax increase.
President Gadaffi of Libya demonstrated the ability and the power of
an individual producer country to dictate its own terms. His initial
success and the continued strain on the delivery system encouraged Presi-
dent Gadaffi to push for better terms. President Gadaffi emerged as a
price leader of the producer countries.
The companies tried to recapture their bargaining power by agreeing
upon a strategy of industry wide bargaining. They figured that the weak-
est countries' need for settlement would discipline OPEC as a whole. The
companies wanted to put pressure on OPEC's "independents."
The exporting countries, however, opposed such industry wide bargain-
ing. They wanted first an agreement for the Persian Gulf and then with
this agreement as a precedent, negotiate agreements for the other produc-
ing areas. The Persian Gulf was in 1970 as today, the marginal source of
petroleum in the world, and the producer countries of the Persian Gulf
were therefore in the strongest bargaining position.
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The issue of industry wide, as opposed to regional negotiations,
brought company executives and OPEC officials to Teheran in February 1971.
An agreement seemed impossible when OPEC launched a very risky venture.
On February 3 the OPEC representatives presented the companies with an
ultimatum. If no agreement was reached by February 15, the separate gov-
ernments would enforce their terms by legislation, imposing a ban on ship-
ments by any company that refused to conform [7]. The companies elected
to meet the OPEC demands, which implied an immediate increase in the
governments' take of about 33 cents, and acceptance of four additional
phased increases in the posted price, on 1st June 1971, and on 1st January
1973, 1974, and 1975. With an agreement established for the Persian Gulf,
agreements for Mediterranean and African crudes were reached in Tripoli
in April.
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements constitute the first significant
pieces of evidence that a cartel was organized and operating among the
petroleum exporting countries of the world. Since then the OPEC countries
have been trying to climb up along the demand curve to benefit from a
monopoly or a joint profit maximizing price.
The October 1973 cutback of production and the following increase in
prices may, however, be explained by a political as well as by an economic
hypothesis. As the October !973 events do certainly not contradict an
economic hypothesis, it was decided that for the purpose of this study a
focus primarily on economic behavior would be appropriate.
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Whether intentionally or not, from an economic point of view the
timing of the October 1973 cutback was excellent. Demand for petroleum
imports were growing close to the 1962-1973 average of 7.5 percent per
year. Partly due to production and price controls of natural gas and
crude oil in the United States, large increases in imports of crude oil
and petroleum products were required. For market clearning at the regu-
lated (frozen) prices, imports would have had to increase by 2 million
barrels per day in 1973 [6]. The U.S. was thus on a 20 percent annual
increase in imports path in 1972-1973, very vulnerable to cut-backs,
and thus easily convinced that higher prices were necessary.
When it was clear that the U.S. would not be able to respond to
higher prices, at least not in the short run, no major consuming country
would be able to respond. Neither Western Europe nor Japan have short-
term alternatives to their petroleum imports. There was consequently
room for a major increase in the price of crude.
The escalation of the cost of crude to the oil companies and of the
level of government take over the last fifteen years is summarized in
Table 2-1. The buy-back price, the buy-back percentage and hence also
the average cost of crude for the period 01/01/74 - 07/01/74 was deter-
mined retroactively. The companies were producing oil in that period
without having a clear idea of what they would have to pay for it. The
intentions of the producing countries seem to have been to do away with
the posted price system. The producer governments expected to sell
their oil in the open market at a price which consisted of the $7 floor
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and a company margin which was not well defined. It soon appeared, how-
ever, that the governments could not sell anything like their buy-back
amounts, and hence forced the companies to take them. The ability of
the companies to take the buy-back oil and resell it at a very high price
showed the governments that they could raise the price. The producer
countries thus went through an important learning process in the spring
of 1974. OPEC demonstrated an impressive level of discipline in the same
period, being able to increase the price significantly at a time when
also excess capacity increased significantly.
The price of crude oil in the Persian Gulf, the base point, and a
set of quality and transportation differentials determine the price other
producers may charge for their crude. The way the producer countries
determine what the companies shall pay ior crude oil and the dramatic
change in ther terms of production are demonstrated in Table 2.2. The
posted price or the tax reference price, which is now being unilaterally
determined by the producer countries, serves as a basis for determining
the producer countries' per barrel revenues. The royalties being paid
are calculated as a percentage of the posted price and are being expensed
for income tax purposes. A per barrel income figure is determined by sub-
tracting production costs and royalty payments from the posted price.
This income figure is then used as a basis for calculating a per barrel
income tax which today is 5% of this imputed income figure. The govern-
ment's per barrel revenues on equity oil, that is, on the oil that the
oil ompanies own according to the concession agreements, are hence equal
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to the sum of the per barrel royalty and income tax. The cost of buy-
back oil and the percentage of the total being bought back by the com-
panies from the governments participating in operating ventures are
additional instruments the producer countries can use to make the
weighted cost of crude, that is the average per barrel cost of crude to
the oil companies, equal to some target price. The tax legislation of
the consumer countries makes it favourable for the oil companies to
realize the profits of their integrated operations in the producer
countries as the companies get a tax credit for the taxes being paid to
the producer countries, and thus can partially eliminate tax liabilities
elsewhere. The company margin used to calculate the transfer price of
crude oil or the F.O.B. cost of crude in the Persian Gulf is thus a
proxy for the companies' profit margin on their integrated operations.
It is likely that the tax rules applicable to oil companies will be
changed to the effect that profits will be distributed more evenly on
their downstream operations by removing the tax credits as they are for-
mulated today. The emerging working relationship between the companies
and the governments may imply that the rather arbitrary determination
of the cost of crude as illustrated in Table 2-2, resulting from the
myriad of contractual and concessionary agreements presently in opera-
tion, will be replaced by some single price-concept.
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TABLE 2-1
THE COST OF CRUDE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
(Arabian Medium, 31 API, Ex. Ras Tanura)
Period Posted Government Tax-Paid Buy-Back % Average
Price Take Cost Price of Cost of
Total Crude
1960-1965 1.80 0.82 0.92 Brought
1966-1967 1.80 0.85 0.95 Back
1968-1969 1.80 0.88 0.98
1/1-11/14, 1970 1.80 0.91 1.01
11/15/70-2/14/71 1.80 0.99 1.10
2/15-5/31/71 2.18 1.26 1.37
6/1/71-1/19/72 2.28 1.32 1.43
1/20/72-1/1/73 2.48 1.44 1.55
1/1-3/31/73 2.59 1.51 1.62
4/1-5/31/73 2.75 1.61 1.71
June 1973 2.90 1.70 1.80
June 1973 2.95 1.74 1.84
August 1973 3.07 1.80 1.90
1/1-10/15/73 3.01 1.77 1.87 2.80 20% 2.05
10/16-12/31/73 5.12 3.05 3.15 4.76 20 3.47
1/1-3/1/74 11.65 7.00 7.10 7.10 25 7.10
3/1-7/1/74 11.65 7.00 7.10 10.82 25 8.04
1/1-7/1/74 11.65 7.00 7.10 10.87 57 9.25
7/1-10/1/74 11.65 7.06 7.16 10.96 62 9.50
10/1-11/1/74 11.65 8.12 8.22 10.96 47 9.81
11/1/74-1/7/75 11.25 9.82 9.92 10.67 58 10.35
1/1/75 - 11.25 9.82 9.92 10.46 56 10.22
Petrcleum Economist & Financial 'TimesSources: Business Wee &
TABLE 2-2
CALCULATION OF THE F.O.B. COST
IN THE PERSIAN GULF
January 71
$1.800POSTED PRICE
Less production cost
Less Royalty
TAXABLE BASE
Income Tax
Royalty
GOVERNMENT TAKE (Equity Oil)
Production cost
TOTAL TAX PAID COST (Equity)
BUY-BACK PRICE
Companies' average cost:
Equity oil
Buy-back oil
WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Typical company margin
F.O.B. COST OF CRUDE
0.10
0.225
1.475
0.738
0.225
0.963
0.10
1.063
1.063
1.063
0.35
1.413
January 1971:
November 1974:
Royalty 12.5% Tax 50%
Royalty 20% Tax 85%, Buy-back price 94.85% of posted
price, 42.1% equity oil and 57.9% buy-back oil.
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OF CRUDE
November
$11.251
0.10
2.250
8.901
7.566
2.250
9.816
0.10
9.916
10.671
9.916
10.671
10.353
0.35
10.703
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
The "majors" completely dominated the international petroleum market
up until 1950. The early concession agreements kept the involvement of
the producer governments at an absolute minimum. The companies were able
to exploit their market power by establishing and maintaining a non-
competitive price level. The early concession agreements were increas-
ingly considered to be offensive to the national pride. The agreements
could not survive in a world of growing nationalism. The non-competitive
price level induces smaller independent oil companies to establish them-
selves as integrated companies with accessto equity crude. Nationalism
also induced consumer countries to establish their own state oil companies
to explore for and produce oil. The entering firms were able to obtain
concessions by offering better terms to the producer countries. A second
generation of concession agreements was based on the 50-50 profit sharing
principle introduced by Venezuela. Veneuela was the only producing
country that played an active role in the conceptualization and implemen-
tation of these concession agreements that helped all the producer
countries reach their goal of higher revenues from the petroleum sector.
The continued entrance of new firms during the 1950's and the 1960's and
the vulnerability of the independents to the actions of individual
producer countries induced the independents to introduce the concepts that
would make it possible for the producer countries to reach their second
goal, direct access to and control of the operating units. The 100%
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"participation" agreements that have been introduced lately, which mean
in effect that the industry has been nationalized, give the producer
countries a control constrained by their level of technical and manager-
ial expertise only.
The development of the contractual relationships can be summarized
as done in Table 2.3, where the two major characteristics of the con-
tractual concepts in their "pure" form are listed as well as their dates
of introduction. Except for the 1st generation of concession agreements
all the contractual concepts as listed in Table 2-3 are included in some
form or another in the existing contractual relationships between the
producer countries and the multinational oil companies.
The downward pressure on price resulting from the increased compe-
tition from the independents made the companies unilaterally decrease
the posted price, the tax reference price, in 1959. Venezuela seized
the opportunity to convince the producing countries of the need for an
organizational counterpart to the oil companies, and OPEC was formed in
September 1960. OPEC managed to reverse the downward trend in nominal
prices, but not in real terms in the 1960's. OPEC seems to have had no
significant impact on the market price of crude oil in the 1960's.
The tanker shortage that developed in 1970 and the resulting drama-
tic increases in the spot market rates, made it possible for President
Gadaffi of Libya being located closer to the consumer markets to obtain
more fcr Libyan crude. The continued strain on the delivery system and
President Gadaffi's resulting continued success in convincing the com-
panies to pay higher taxes made Gadaffi an ideological as well as a
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price leader of the exporters. The cohesiveness and the confidence of the
exporting countries increased dramatically following Gadaffi's success. In
Teheran and Tripoli in 1971 OPEC was able to force its demands through as
a cartel. The exporter countries had decided to collude to enforce their
demands. The strength of the colluding group was not tested as the oil
companies chose to avoid a confrontation by agreeing to the increase in
government take.
The October 1973 cutback of production demonstrated the cohesiveness
of the dominating Arab subset of OPEC. OPEC has since then also shown an
impressive level of discipline by being able to live with a considerable
excess capacity without cutting prices. President Gadaffi seems to have
lost his leading role. Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria tend to dominate
the political stage, Algeria and Iran the role as price leaders. Two
years after the embargo political pragmatism and economic development
seem to dominate the decisions of the producing countries in the Middle
East. This does not imply, however, that the relationship between the
producer countries, especially in the Persian Gulf, does not have a major
political ingredient affecting their oil policies, neither does it imply
that one or more major producers will not again use their control over
oil, volumes and prices, to gain political favors from the West.
The presently emerging contractual regime is giving the individual
exporter governments control over production of oil. OPEC as an organiza-
tion has, however, no instruments available to regulate prices and
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production rates. Production programs or pro-rationing has been dis-
cussed but never implemented. OPEC is no more than a forum for discus-
sions and for coordination of the price- and production policies of the
individual exporting countries. Except for the threat of cut-off in
Teheran and the October 1973 embargo, the producer countries have never
made decisions affecting the rate of production on a joint basis. Even
during the embargo period the production policies of all the OPEC
countries were not perfectly coordinated. Iran being the most signi-
ficant non-conformist increased production significantly while the Arab
subset of OPEC restricted output (11). Since the first major tax or
price increase, the producer countries have accepted the way the market
place and the lifting schedules of the oil companies have allocated
production and profits among the exporters. The producer countries
have thereby been able to avoid confrontations over these critical
issues. The recent accomplishments of the exporting countries cannot
be explained by their experience in operating an oil industry. The
experience of the countries that nationalized the oil industry (Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, and Libya) is somewnat more advanced than the
experience of the countries that followed a participation-path (Abu
Dhabi, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia). Venezueia, which has
also decided to nationalize the oil industry, is the most experienced
with respect to makin: decisions on prices and production rates. Even
if the oil companies have dei,,onstrated that it is ossible to maintain
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a non-competitive price level in the petroleum industry as long as the.
colluding agreement covers a sufficient share of total supplies, the lack
of experience in coordinating production-rates, the lack of access to the
final consumer markets, the heterogeneity of the producer countries, and
the increasing government involvement in the marketing of crude, leading
possibly to confrontations the exporters are not prepared to face, may
make it difficult or impossible for the producer countries to agree on a
common tax or price policy. To determine the extent to which these fac-
tors have affected the success and the longevity of cartel-like collusive
arrangements, a review was made of the research findings on previous car-
tels as reported in Chapter 3. The success of the exporters in sticking
to an increasing price in the light of the level of excess capacity has,
however, been so impressive that they may be reluctant to or careful
about changing the present market- and company-determined system of
allocating production and profits. This system may be considered fair
and just as long as there is no evidence that the companies deliberately
try to divert the way the marketplace ranks the competitiveness of the
various countries' crudes.
The oil companies are not yet powerless. They provide a service for
which there is no institutionalized organizational substitute. In the
foreseeable future, the oil companies will still be indespensable to an
orderly growth of production and distribution in the international oil
industry. This is true not only because of their technical and logistics
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capacity, but more importantly, because the companies constitute total
systems wherein all of the various parts are integrated and attuned to
one another. The significance of their logistics capacity was demon-
strated during the embargo, when the companies were able to partially
divert supplies, thereby reducing the effect on the primary targets of
the embargo, the Netherlands and the U.S.[ll].
The oil companies will probably continue to be the target of both
producer and consumer disatisfaction. From the perspective of the pro-
ducer countries, collusion between the oil companies and the consumer
countries seem to be a fact. The companies did reduce prices in 1959
and in real terms also in the 1960's. During the last year the oil
companies have been accused by the consumer countries of colluding with
the producer governments. To the extent that any company owns petro-
leum reserves, such a company shares the interests of OPEC in high
world market prices for crude oil.
The companies are severely constrained, however, in their ability
to resist producer government initiatives, even if the oil companies
are an important component of the mechanism for raising and supporting
international oil prices.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EXPERIENCE OF PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CARTELS
3.1 Introduction and Summary
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements of 1971 between the oil exporting
countries and the oil companies constituted the first significant pieces
of evidence that a cartel was being operated by the oil exporting
countries. The price-making power of OPEC was clearly demonstrated in the
fall of 1973 and in 1974. The average price of crude in the Persian Gulf
increased by 505% between October 15, 1973 and November 1, 1974. As long
as the OPEC countries can agree on a joint market strategy they can take
advantage of their monopoly power and enjoy monopoly profits. A cartel is
however, an unstable unit even from a theoretic point of view. The market
solution resulting from explicit collusion among oligopolists cannot be
uniquely determined. The OPEC countries are also a rather heterogenous
group of countries. To learn about the efficiency and longevity of car-
tels, a review was made of the research findings on the efficiency and the
longevity of international cartel agreements.
The economics and political science literature contains more than 50
studies of the operation of cartels in the trade of international commodi-
ties. Agreements have been formed by companies and countries in commodi-
ties as far ranging as tin and tea; these agreements have lasted for vary-
ing lengths of time, and have had varying degrees of success in curtail-
ing production and raising prices to consuming countries. The research
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literature has documented cartel "success" and has provided a number of
reasons why some cartels have worked better than others. Here we review
and compile research results n a way which should indicate central
factors in the operation of workable versus unworkable cartel agreements.
Although there have been numerous cartels in almost every commodity
in international trade, only a small number of these price-controlling
organizations have been studied in detail. Of those studied, even a
smaller number have been analyzed sufficiently comDletely to make it
possible to tell the difference between cartel success or failure. We
have found evidence on 51 cartel agreements in 18 industries. These
constitute two samples from which we draw conclusions on the factors
determining the success or failure of cartels.
Cartel success or "efficiency" has been defined in terms of the
ability of the organization to raise price at least 200% above the unit
costs of production and distribution. If the cost to the highest cost
member of the cartel at the marin were $1.00 per ton then the cartel
would be efficient if it raised prices to $3.00 per ton and kept them
there for a significant period of time.
The review indicates that of the 51 sicnificant cartel organizations
reported, only 19 ahcieved price controls which raised the level of
charges o consumers significantly above what they would have been in the
absence of acreements. But even the efficient cartels did not seem to
last very long. Cartels were able to raise prices or four years or more,
where concentration f roduction was hich, demands inelastic, the cartel's
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market share was high, the membership had cost advantages over outsiders,
and governments did not get involved in the operations of the cartel.
If OPEC were to follow the pattern set by the 19 earlier "efficient"
cartels, then it would likely have a 4 to 6-year duration. The primary
source of breakdown would likely be the uncontrolled additions of supply
from the "fringe" of OPEC countries (Iraq, Indonesia, Nigeria) or from the
non-member countries.
3.2 Cartel Characteristics
The information available on international cartel agreements is not
sufficient for rigorous empirical hypothesis testing. The studies made
on cartels differ significantly in terms of their level of detail and
research focus. From a theoretic point of view all important aspects of a
cartel agreement were not covered in the studies that have been reviewed.
For the purpose of this study we therefore constructed two samples out of
the 51 cartel agreements on which we had enough information to judge
whether the cartel agreement had been successful or not. To identify the
most important factors determining the "efficiency" and longevity of
cartel agreements each cartel was summarized along a number of dimensions.
Due to the anecdotal and/or vague nature of the data, we have been limited
to a very tight range of response, often to binary representation. On the
cartels belonging to sample 1 we had sufficient data to describe the
cartels alone 17 dimensions. Samole 2 consists of cartels on which we
had sufficient data to code 5 dimensions only. The dimensions are
intended to describe as completely as possible the known occurrences of
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Dimension 5. If short-term substitutes for a commodity exist, the
value of 1 is assigned; if no substitutes exist, 0 is assigned to the
commodity.
Dimension 6. The existence of long-term substitutes is treated the
same as for dimension 5.
Dimension 7. If governments were involved in the cartel agreement,
a value of 1 is assigned; otherwise a value of 0 is assigned.
Dimension 8. The length of survival of the formal agreement in
years.
Dimension 9. If the cartel members' share of total prediction in
the industry is above 75 percent, a score of 2 is assigned; if the cartel
members share is between 50 and 75 ercent a score of 1 is assigned. A
score of 0 is assigned if the share is below 50 percent.
Dimension 10. If the cartel members are responsible for more than
75 percent of total exports in the international export/imDort market, a
score of 2 is assioned. A score of 1 indicates that the cartel members
export between 50 and 75 percent of the total; a value o- 0 is assigned
if the cartel members export less than 50 percent of that particular
commodity.
Dimension 11. This dimension is included to test whether industries
learn over time, that is if the number of previous attempts to organize
a cartel influence the success of later attempts to organize. The score
's equal to the particular cartel's number in this sequence of attempts.
Dimension 12. Members are aiven a score of 1 if the cost differences
within the cartel are less than 50 percent - that is, if the high-cost
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producers produce at a cost no larger than 50 percent above the low-cost
producers. Otherwise, the dimension is given a score of 0.
Dimension 13. The efficiency of the cartel refers to the ability to
charge prices close to the monopoly price, i.e., if price is 200 percent
of marginal cost or more. Otherwise, the score of 0 is assigned. This
very rough indicator of cartel efficiency was applied because information
on the location and slope of the demand curve and the location and slope
of the marginal cost curve usually was not sufficient to allow calcula-
tion of the monopoly price.
Dimension 14. This dimension is given a score of 0 if the cartel
members' potential time horizon is more than 1 year and a score of 1 if
the time horizon is less than 1 year.
Dimension 15. The dimension is given the score of 0 if a cartel
breakdown was not-market-related, i.e., due to overnment intervention,
war, etc., and a score of I if the breakdown was market-related, i.e.,
due to the loss of markets to outsiders or the emergence of competition
between cartel members'.
Dimension 16. This expands on no. 15 by assigning a value of 1 if
the breakdown was market-related and due to external forces, i.e., non-
member suppliers or consumer retaliation, and a value of 0 if the cartel
broke down due to an internal conflict between the cartel members.
Dimension 17. This final measure further expands onthe breakdown
issue by assicning a value of 1 if the external forces were outside
supply, i.e., non-member supp:ies, and a value of 0 if the response of
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consumers or demand response constituted the external forces that
caused the cartel breakdown.
3.2.2. Cartel Characteristics of Sample 2
This second sample was necessary because we did not have sufficient
information to characterize the cartels along the full set of 17 dimen-
sions shown above. The attributes of Sample 2, therefore, should be
viewed as a quick summary, and are essentially a subset of the attributes
of Sample 1.
Dimension 1. This refers to the length in years of the agreement,
see no. 8 above.
Dimension 2. This attribute is similar but not identical to
Dimension of Sample 1 above. If the four-firm concentration ratio is
more than 75 percent, a score of 2 is assigned. A 1 is given if
between 50 and 75 percent. Concentration of less than 50 percent is
designated as 0.
Dimension 3. Here we are referring to concentration within the
cartel itself. See Dimension 9 of Sample 1 above.
Dimension 4. Cartel breakdown is analyzed as in Dimension 16 in
Sample 1.
Dimension 5. Cartel efficiency is described as in Dimension 13
in Sample 1.
3.3 SamDle 1
Sample 1 consists of the industries on which we were able to obtain
information to assign a numerical value to the 17 dimensions defined
-57-
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Table 3-2
CHARACTERISTICS OF "INEFFICIENT" CARTELS
Sample 1
Year
1. Concentration of Production
2. Concentration of Exports/
Imports
3. Demand Elasticity
4. Income Elasticity
5. Short-Term Substitutes
6. Long-Term Substitutes
7. Government Involvement
8. Length of Formal Agreement
9. Cartel Members' Share of
Total Production
10. Cartel Members' Share of
Exports/Imports
11. Number of Recorded Attempts
to Set Prices
12. Cost Differences Among
Cartel Members
13. Efficiency
14. Potential Time Horizon of
Agreement
15. Break-down Market Related
16. Break-down Externally
17. Break-down due to External
Supply
Rubber
1922
1
Tin
1929 1931 1935
1 1 1
1 1 1
O 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 1 1
2- 3 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 2 3
O O C
O O 0
O 0 0
1 1 1
O 0 0
Suqar
1931 1937 195~
O O O
1 1 0
O 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 1
4 2 3
O 2 2
2 2 2
5 6 ?
O 0 1
O O O
0
1
0 1
0 0
i
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Table 
CHARACTERISTICS
Year
Concentration of Production
Concentration of Exports/
Imports
Demand Elasticity
Income Elasticity
Short-Term Substitutes
Long-Term Substitutes
Government Involvement
Length of Formal Agreement
Cartel Members' Share of
Total Production
10. Cartel Members' Share
Exports/Imports
of
11. Number of Recorded Attempts
to Set Prices
12. Cost Differences Among
Cartel Members
13. Efficiency
Potential Time Horizon of
Agreement
Break-down Market Related
Break-down Externally
Break-down due -o External
Supply
3-2 (Continued)
OF "INEFFICIENT"
Sample 1
Steel
1926 1930 1931 1933
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
4 0.5 0.17 6
0 0 0 2
1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0
CARTELS
0
0
12.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Tea
1933
1
0
0
0
Copper
1955 1964
1 1
i 1
O O
O O
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
0 2
0 2
? ?
1 1
0 O
0 0
1 1
1 1
0 0
14.
16.
17.
-
- -
-
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The British colonies contained 72 percent of world capacity in 1922.
The Dutch colonies contained another 25 percent of world capacity. The
Dutch twice refused cooperation, but took advantage of the plan by
increasing production. The British market share decreased from 67.5 per-
cent in 1922 to 54.1 percent in 1927, whereas the market share of the
Dutch colonies increased from 23.2 percent to 37.7 percent.
Outside production, internal rivalry, as well as the problems of
timing of restrictions were the reasons for the failure of the Stephen-
son Plan.
The International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934 did, however,
succeed in increasing prices so that the average producer, according to
Stocking and Watkins, could enjoy a margin of 126 percent, and we judged
the cartel to have been efficient, given the fact that the cartel lived
with the threat of synthetic rubber.
British, Dutch, French, Indian and Siamese kept the agreement up
until World War II, even though attacked by U.S. protests, which resulted.
in the organization of a semi-official resistance movement to conserve
tires and use reclaimed rubber.
The consumption of rubber was assumed to be income-elastic.
2. Tin
Production of tin was dominated by a few governments in the Far East-
Malaysia (Dutch), Thailand, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo. These produ-
cers tried to regulate tin prices, but our recorded attempts, 1929-1931,
1931-1935, and 1935-1937 were all failures due to lack of iscipline and
enforcement of the restrictive measures.
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There was no satisfactory substitute for tin, even though there was
some secondary recovery of tin from scrap. Tin was indispensible in arma-
ments and we assumed that demand was inelastic as is also the case today,
according to C. Fred Bergsten. The statement by Hexner that "production
costs varied from mine to mine" is the basis for our assumption that costs
differed by more than 50 percent.
3. Mercury
According to Hexner and Burrows, the price of mercury has been close
to the monopoly price since 1928. Spain and Italy have completely domin-
ated the production of this commodity for which no substitute exists. As
mercury is also indispensible in armaments, price-elastic and income-
elastic demand is assumed.
The cost difference between Spanish and Mexican producers is assumed
to be above 50 percent. The cartel established in 1928 broke down in 1936
due to the Spanish 1,;ar. It was reestablished in 1939 and then lasted until
1949 when it broke down due to internal problems. Since 1950 there have
never been more than 3 years of disagreement amona the major mercury
producers of the world.
4. Aluminum
Originally due to patent rights, and later due to inter-corporate ties,
the aluminum industry has been highly concentrated. The sequence of car-
tels, 1901-1906, 1906-1908, 1912-1914, 1923-1926, 1S26-1930, and 1931-1936,
all seem to have been successful in stabilizing the monooly level of the
previous period.
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According to Donald H. Wallace, the elasticity of demand increased in
the latter twenties due to the conversion of latent into effective demand
through the development of new alloys and products. Aluminum became at
this time a capable substitute for various alloys of iron, copper, and
zinc in heavy-duty components. The aluminum industry was under-going a
process of transition from a condition of limited markets to one of diver-
sified markets. We therefore assumed that demand moved from the inelastic
to the elastic segment of the demand curve in the late twenties.
Demand also seems to have been income-elastic in this period. The
importance of technology should imply that cost differences were small.
The capital-intensity of consumption seems to indicate that no short-term
substitutes existed even if long-term substitutes did exist.
5. Steel
The first international steel cartel, 1926-1930, consisted of
national steel cartels united in an association. The national steel.
cartels had government support, but was primarily of a private character.
This first cartel produced 30 percent of the world's output of steel
and 66 percent of world exports. It collapsed, however, in 1930 due to.
internal problems. In 1930 a second international steel cartel experien-
ced half a year of frustration. In 1931 a third cartel lasted fr only
two months. A fourth cartel that lasted from 1933 to 1939 had, according
to Stocking and Watkins, some success in keeping prices higher than other-
wise would have been the case and was also able to discriminate between
customers. The price series does not, however, seem to support a judg-
ment on the cartel as being efficient.
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6. Tea
There have been a number of attempts to organize cartels in the tea
industry. The International Tea Cartel from 1933 to 1939 was regarded as
an interesting example of a collective marketing control established by
trade associations with the cooperation of governments. The concentra-
tion in the industry was low. Demand was probably price inelastic as is
the case today, according to C. Fred Bergsten. Demand also seems to have
been income-elastic in the relevant period. Cost differences were most
likely high. The War prompted the British Ministry of Food to take over
the whole tea supply and fix prices according to the average price pre-
vailing at the end of 1938. The price series seem to indicate that the
cartel had no effect on prices.
7. Sucar (1864-1939)
The concentration in the sugar industry is low. In the export mar-
kets, however, the concentration is hich due to common sales agencies.
According to Stocking and Watkins, demand was price-inelastic prior to
World War II. Demand seems to have been income-elastic in the same
period.
In 1864, 1902-12, 1929, 1942, 1953, 1956 and 1958 cartel attempts in
this industry are included in Sample 2. The first international sugar
cartel we include in this sample is the so-called Chadbourne Agreement of
1931-1935, which was a private marketing control agreement, approved and
enforced by the respective governments. Failure to restrict production
efficiently and the rap dly increasing market share f utsiders made the
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Chadbourne Agreement collapse. On the initiative of the League of
Nations, a new international agreement was signed on May 6, 1937. It was
a diplomatic treaty between 21 governments representing 85-90 percent of
the world's sugar production and consumption. Prices were stabilized
some 30 percent above the 1935-1936 average prices, and the cartel was
accordingly judged to be inefficient. The agreement was disrupted by
the War in 1939.
8. Sugar (1958-1961)
Today nearly 90 percent of the world's sugar is either consumed in
the areas where it is produced or is marketed under a quota system. This
means that a very small proportion of all sugar produced is freely traded
in international markets. In the short-term, corn syrup and other sweeten-
ers can be substituted for cane or beet sugar. The precise elasticity of
demand is not well known, but it was judged to be inelastic in the near
term.
Sugar trading receives protection from many government-backed comno-
dity agreements. In the U.S. there is a U.S. Sugar Act. In Great Britain
the comparable pact is the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. In 1958
an International Sugar Agreement (ISA) was negotiated between all of the
large producing nations in order to stabilize the wide fluctuations in
prices. This international agreement was not able to restrict fluctua-
tions, but it did serve to prevent any further declines in average prices.
The ISA broke up in 1961 because of growing difficulties between the U.S.
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and its major sugar trading partner, Cuba. Until that time the U.S. had
gotten 75 percent of its imports from Cuba. However, in mid-1961 the
U.S. cancelled all international trade with Cuba and sought other sources
of sugar elsewhere in Latin America. At the same time. Cuba had huge
supplies which had to be sold in other, non-U.S. markets. This instabil-
ity in market conditions was enough to cause the ISA to crumble and world
prices to fall.
9. Copper (1950-1970)
Most of the free world's copper supply is found in fewer than 7
countries and is refined by what is known as "the big eight" firms, for
uses in electrical and other industrial processes. Quantitative estimates
of the short-run elasticity of demand (between .21 and .48) have under-
scored that demand is relatively inelastic since not many short-run sub-
stitutes are available. In the long run (10 years or more), alternatives
are more feasible and demand elasticity is relatively elastic (approxi-
mately 2.8). (Burrows, 1974.)
During the mid-1950's, and again in the mid-1960's, producers made
attempts to influence the market price. These actions were generally
taken with the full knowledge and cooperation of the respective govern-
ments. Chile, Peru, Zambia, and the Congo have been the most active in
this regard and have formed a oint body, CIPEC, to promote their common
interests. The initial price experiment (1955-1956) was undertaken by a
Zambian producer who felt that he could appreciably affect the price of
copper by imposing a ceiling on price. The unilateral attempt was
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unsuccessful, however, in that the cooperation of other producing firms
was not attained.
A second price experiment (1965-1966) found more support among the
large producers, and consequently was far more successful from their
perspective. In the two-year period, copper prices doubled as the "big
eight," as well as smaller firms, temporarily agreed on common goals.
After two years of steadily rising prices, agreement among producers
faded as some began shading on prices. Explanations of the breakdown have
noted that some of the less developed countries have vastly different time
horizons than many of the private producers. For example, while Chile was
interested in expoliting a short-run demand in elasticity, many of the
private firms were much more conservatively inclined with an eye toward
preserving long-run demand and discouraging the development of copper
substitutes.
3.4. Sample 2
Sample no. 2 consists of the industries on which we were able to
obtain information sufficiently detailed only to code the five dimensional
cartel table defined above. The sources of information are identical to
those of Sample no. 1. The influence of our personal judgment is, however,
more severe on this sample than on the first sample. The results are
shown in Table 3-3.
1. Wheat
In 1933 the first international wheat agreement was established by
governments of wheat-producing and importing countries, without direct
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reference to private entrepreneurs or their organizations. The agreement
broke down within a year due to disagreement over quotas and acreage
reduction in addition to a very unfavorable price development. In 1942
Argentina, Australia, England, the U.S. and Canada established a new pool,
limited in scope, but to be extended after the war. This plan collapsed,
however, in 1947 when Argentina abstained.
The post-war international wheat arrangements have been for three-
year periods. The 1949 wheat agreement was renewed in 1953 and 1956,
then revised substantially in 1959 and renewed in 1962, which is the last
year on which we have any information. Too weak jurisdiction over
members has made these agreements inefficient.
2. Copper (1918-1940)
In 1918 a cartel was formed to liquidate the tremendous stocks of
copper piled up as a result of the war and to regulate new production and
exports. It was wholly American in membership. It represented 95 per-
cent of the American production. The only outsider was Katanga, still in
its infancy. The cartel was disbanded in 1924 after dissension arose
between the companies with foreign properties and these with purely
domestic properties. The cartel was successful in liquidating stocks
without causing a sharp fall in prices, and also in regulating exports.
It was consequently judged to have been efficient.
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In 1926 Copper Exporters Inc. (a Webb-Pomerene association) was
established. The company controlled 95 percent of the world's production
of copper. The combined effect of the 1928-29 boon and cartel rationing
sent prices upwards. The resentment against the cartel grew so strong,
however, that a buyer's strike was called. Fromf then until the dissolu-
tion of the cartel in 1932, with the enactment of the U.S. excise tax on
copper, the power position of the cartel steadily declined. On the 1935-
1941 international copper cartel information relating to world markets
outside the U.S. is scarce.
3. Platinum
In 1918 several producers tried unsuccessfully to organize a cartel.
In 1931, however, an agreement was signed, only to break down in 1933.
Due to the fact that platinum is mainly a by-product and that palladium
which is a substitute was not included, control of the market by the
cartel seems to have been impossible.
4. Quebracho
Argentina and Paraguay have completely dominated this industry. In
both countries the quebracho producers were organized in a government-
sponsored cartel. In the periods 1919-1922, 1926-1931, and 1934-1946
(1946 being the last year on which we have information) these two national
cartels operated jointly in the international market through establishing
exclusive sales agencies, export uotas and uniform price policies. In
1942 the American agents were indicted for violation of anti-trust
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regulations. As we have not been able to obtain additional information,
this indictment (as well as a 1920-1939 price series) is the basis on
which we have judged the cartels to have been efficient.
5. Sulfur
In 1838 the United Kingdom broke the Sicilian sulfur monopoly by
sending gunboats. In 1934 a cartel was organized among the U.S. and
Italian producers. The U.S. had at that time 80 percent, Italy 11 per-
cent and Japan 6 percent of the world's production of crude sulfur. The
cartel had complete control over export supplies and markets through the
use of export quotas and uniform prices. According to Hexner, "Signifi-
cant international agreements concerning sulfur are most characteristic
of modern cartellization." U.S. anti-trust actions and some information
on prices is the basis for judging the cartel to have been efficient up
until World War II.
6. Sodium Sulphate (Salt Lake)
Important outsiders seem to have made life difficult for the cartels
in this industry from 1926-1930 and 1930-1939.
7. Potash
Under strong pressure from the French and German governments, the
potash exporters of these two countries formed a cartel in 1926. Germany
was at that time responsible for about 60 percent and France for about 16
percent of the world's production of potash. Export prices were to be
determined by production costs. American producers were, however,
indicted in 1939 under the Sherman Act because of alleged cooperation in
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price policies among themselves and with the European cartel. It was
stated that this natural monopoly was abused by Germany and France. As
export prices of potash were not published, the above-mentioned evidence
is the basis for judging the cartel to have been efficient.
8. Phosphate Rock
World phosphate exports were regulated by an agreement established
in 1933 and further amplified in 1934 and 1935. The agreement embraced
the whole international market. The agreement is surrounded by a high
degree of secrecy. From 1929 to 1939 phosphate prices tend, however, to
support our udgment on the cartel as having been efficient.
9. Magnesite
In 1923 Czechoslovak and Austrian producers established a joint-
stock sales company to regulate the international magnesite market. An
"understanding" with American producers was also obtained. The large
magnesite consumers were the shareholders of the magnesite companeis
involved. In 1941 there was a U.S. Justice Department indictment for
U.S. - European division of world magnesite markets. Or. tnis basis we
judged the cartel to have been efficient.
10. Diamonds
Government licencing and monopoly support have helped monopolize the
diamond industry. In 1930 a diamond trading company was established as
the sole selling agency for 99 percent of African diamond production or
95 percent of world diamond production. The British government took over
the company in 1942, after wna is assumed to have been 12 successful
years.
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11. Coffee (1957; 1958; 1959-1962)
Coffee is primarily grown in Brazil, other Latin American nations,
and Africa. Since World War II, world production has sharply increased,
while simultaneously Brazil's market share has steadily declined. Pro-
duction is almost universally undertaken in the ess developed countries
and as such represents a substantial amount of these countries' GNP. Due
to chronic conditions of over supply, especially in Brazil, several
exporting nations have periodically attempted to stabilize or bolster
sagging coffee prices.
In 1957, and again in 1958, there were Latin American Coffee Agree-
ments that were signed. Most Latin producers agreed to hold back aper-
centage of their harvests from the market with Brazil leading the charge
with a 40 percent reduction. Neither agreement was successful in raising
prices because African nations filled the gap with their own coffee.
In 1959 the African producers agreed to enter an International Coffee
Agreement, in which there was 85 percent participation y world producers.
The agreement set fixed export quotas which were based on 90 percent of
past exports or 88 percent of estimated future exports. The agreement was
renewed annually and was significant in that consuming nations were also
included. The system has had the effect of providing a floor and
increased stability for formerly volatile coffee prices.
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3.5 Conclusions and Extensions
There are nine efficient and fourteen inefficient cartels in sample 1.
Also, ten efficient and eighteen inefficient agreements make up sample 2.
Therefore, of the 51 significant cartel organizations only 19 acheived
price controls which raised the level of charges to consumers signifi-
cantly above what they would have been in the absence of the agreements.
The results for these two samples are summarized in Tables 3-4 and 3-5.
The efficient cartels did not seem to last very long. Although
formal organizational agreements (to set up cartel management, for
example) lasted longer in the efficient cartels, the average length of
effective controls on price was not more than four to five years. The
mercury cartel in the 1930's and 1940's, and the potash, magnesite, and
diamond cartels of the 1930's, seem to have been able to control prices
for as long as a decade, but these were not major products in interna-
tional trade. The more important products, such as rubber in the 1930's
or aluminum, copper or sulfur before World War II, experienced cartel
longevity from one to four years.
There are a number of factors important in the longevity of the
efficient cartel. Without these factors, it would seem to have been
impossible for most cartel organizations to last for more than a few
months.
!. Concentration of roduction was characteristic of the efficient
carte'. Approximately 90o of the efficient cartels in sample 1 had con-
centration levels higher than 50, (the largest four firms had more than
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Table 3-4
SUMMARY TABLE
Sample 1
"Efficient" "Inefficient"
A. Number of Cartels
B. Average Length of Formal Agreement
(Years)
1. Concentration of Production
(High:l, Low:O)
2. Concentration of Exports/Imports
(High:l, Low:O)
3. Demand Elasticity
(Elastic:l, Inelastic:O)
4. Income Elasticity
(Elastic:l, Inelastic:O)
5. Short-Term Substitutes
(No:O, Yes:l)
6. Long-Term Substitutes
(No:O, Yes:l)
7. Government Involvement
(No:O, Yes:l)
9. Cartel Members' Share of Total Prod.
(Very high:2, High:l, Low:0)
10. Cartel Members' Share of Exp./Imp.
(Very high:2, High:l, Low:0)
12. Cost Differences Among Cartel Members
(High:O, Low:l)
14. Potential Time Horizons of Agreements
(Lona:O, Short:l)
15. Break-down (Non-market related:0,
(Market-related:l)
16. If Market-related Break-down, Then
(Externally:i, Internally:O)
17. If External Reason for Break-down,
Then (Supply:l, Deman:O)
9 14
5 3.1
0.9 0.36
0.9 0.5
0.22 0.06
1 0.78
0.22 0.43
0.77 0.43
0.11 0.58
0.9 1.14
2 1.58
0.9 0.58
0 0.08
0.66 0.70
0.33 0.30
1 0.5
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Table 3-5
SUMMARY TABLE
Sample 2
A. Number of Cartels
B. Average Length of Formal
(Years)
Agreement
2. Concentration of Production
(Very high:.2, High:l, Low:O)
3. Cartel Members' Share of Total Prod.
(Very high:2, High:l, Low:O)
4. Break-down
(Externally:l, Internally:0)
"Efficient" "Inefficient"
10 18
8 2.7
1.6
2
0.55
1.2
0.28
-
-
0.6
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50% of total production or capacity to produce); but only 36% of the
inefficient cartels had concentration levels this high. Similarly, the
efficient cartels controlled a very high percentage of exports.
2. Demand conditions also strongly affected the chances that the
cartel agreement worked well and lasted for a reasonable period of time.
The summary tables show that the efficient cartels were characterized by
inelastic demands (lack of sensitivity of quantities demanded to price
changes), and that they also were characterized by the lack of short term
substitutes in most cases (only 22% of the efficient cartels in the first
sample had no long term substitutes); but this was also true of the
inefficient cartels. The presence of ability to substitute other products
in the long run may have limited both the length of life time and the
efficiency of the agreement.
3. Government involvement made a difference in the success of the
agreement. Government agencies were involved in the setting up of the
organization of the cartel in almost 90% of the cases in which the cartel
did work well. Although not much information was provided in the studies
as to what the governments' activities were, it is presumed that at some
stage political and diplomatic relations entered into the cartel organiza-
tions so as to break down the agreements.
4. Supply conditions differentiated efficient from inefficient car-
tels. Most of the successful cartels had as members one or two firms with
production costs mhuch lower than other firms, the lowest cost firms tend-
ing to "dominate" operation of the agreements. When cartels did break
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down, it was mostly because of entry of additional suppliers or the
expansion of supply by small firms outside the cartels' agreements (as
shown by line 14 of the summary table for sample 1, Table 4).
In summary, there seem to be several important factors differentiat-
ing efficient from inefficient cartel agreements.
Cartels were able to raise prices for four years or more, where
concentration of production was high, demands inelastic, and-where few
short term substitutes were available for the cartelized product.
Governments were involved in breaking down agreements. Operating cost
advantages and the presence of few outside sources of supply able to
expand capacity were important for cartel success. These factors are
shown in the summary table for sample 1, as those conditions of the 14
listed, for which the efficient cartel had significantly different values
from the inefficient cartel.1
Much the same is shown by sample 2, because the concentration of
efficient cartels is significantly higher than the inefficient. Also the
cartel members' share of total roduction was much higher, and if cartel
breakdown occurred, it was mostly because of entry into international
markets by new firms.
By "significant difference" we mean a rough qualitative difference in the
magnitude of the statistics between 0.0 and 1.0 in the two columns of the
tables. For tnose six factors termed sinificant" the differences in
table values range from .32 to .56. Althouch here are smaller differen-
ces indicated by other factors, we cnose to ignore thnem at this ime
because of small samDie size and ne nighiy ualitative nature of the
values assianed between 0 and 1 etween each cartel attrIbute.
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There are further important dimensions not included in the findings
from the earlier research studies. Indications scattered throughout the
studies are that an important additional factor for cartel success or
failure is tight control of distribution channels. The iodine cartel
lasted more than 50 years as an organization without significant disrup-
tion, by making all iodine sales out of a single cartel association office
in London (although there were no findings on the ability of this organiza-
tion to raise unit price above unit cost). There are other examples in
which additional elements of control seem to have followed from cartel
supervision of distribution, but these are too scattered to lead to a
research conclusion at this time. Similarly, the factor of the level of
concentration among consumers seems to be important in some cases. Where
there are only a few consumers and they are able to play one cartel member
off against the other, then the efficiency of the cartel would appear to
have been limited. But high buyer concentration was found only in very
few cases and cannot be said to be a "finding" from the research analysis.
Probably the most important determinant of the longevity of a cartel
agreement is the way production and profits are allocated among the cartel
members. The unavailability of information on this aspect of a cartel
agreement made it impossible to determine the level of conflict among the
cartel members. Given the fact that the "efficient" cartel broke down
more often due to the emergence of competition among the members rather
.han due to the response of non-members, the internal operating mechanisms
of cartels have to be analyzed if we want to learn more about the stability
of cartel-dominated markets.
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The conslusions on important factors for cartels' success, and the
summary tables themselves, are based upon the reading and evaluation of
research materials in a wide variety of industries and cases. There is a
strong element of personal judgment in the assigning of such attributes
as "high concentration" or "lack of short term substitutes." It should
be stressed that another review of this material might well establish
somewhat different factors in the efficiency of agreements, or whether in
fact an agreement was efficient or inefficient. But the overall impres-
sion that efficient cartels do not last very long would probably not be
dispelled. Neither would the finding that high concentration, the
presence of a dominant producer, and the lack of expansion by those out-
side the cartel, contribute very strongly to cartel price control over
the 4 to 6-year lifetime of a typical organization.
3.6 Imlications for OPEC
What do these factors tell us about the causes for the efficiency
and longevity of the present day petroleum cartel? There have been petro-
leum cartels at an earlier time; the "as is" or "Achnacarry" agreement of
the late 1920's to maintain output shares of American oil exporting
companies collapsed in 1930 without having had a significant effect on
European markets. Later similar agreements with quotas and fines did not
collapse, but there is little or no evidence that tney had an appreciable
effect on price levels before World War II. From 1945 to 1960 there were
no formal agreements.
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But prices were "high" in the sense that marginal production costs
plus user charges could not have exceeded $1.00 per barrel, while prices
were mostly centered around $2.00/barrel. The companies were hence about
to maintain a non-competitive price level. Since the advent of the
highly efficient OPEC cartel operation in the early 1970's, price-cost
differences have increased to many times those expected from the earlier
cartels.
The present day OPEC agreement has many of the characteristics found
in the earlier cartels that were successful for limited time periods in
other industries. The demands for final product are inelastic, and there
are few short term substitutes for this product. Concentration within
the cartel is substantial, and OPEC itself as an organization supplies
about 900 of the total flow in international trade. The Arab subset of
OPEC supplies 54% alone of the total international flow. There are sub-
stantial cost differences among firms, with the Persian Gulf producers
having significant cost advantages and significantly greater capacity
than the "fringe" of Southeast Asian, East African and South American
countries.
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements in 1971 between the oil exporting
countries and the oil companies may be considered as the first evidence
of an efficient producer country petroleum cartel. Since then the produ-
cer countries have been able to successfully raise prices to a level that
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makes OPEC the most efficient cartel in modern times. The OPEC countries
have not, however, been able to agree on and stick to a formal system for
sharing production among the member nations. As long as the OPEC members
accept the way the major oil companies allocate the reductions in produc-
tion and/or profits allocation systems makes, however, OPEC as vulnerable
to emergence of internal compeition as the cartels that have been
reviewed, even if the willingness to accept production cutbacks and to
live with a hugh excess capacity has been impressive.
If OPEC were to follow the pattern set by the 19 earlier "efficient"
organizations, then it would likely have a 4 to 6-year duration. The
primary source of breakdown of price controls would likely be the signifi-
cant additions of supply from either the "fringe" of OPEC members, or the
non-member countries (in this case, the North Sea countries, Canada, and
the United States) which by self-supply reduce the demands placed on the
low cost Persian Gulf states.
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CHAPTER 4
CARTEL THEORY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
MARKET
4.1 Oliqopoly Theory
A cartel is a lable assigned to a group of suppliers that has
entered into an explicit agreement to limit competition for mutual benefit.
The circumstance under which this is feasible is when the number of
suppliers of a particular good or service is "small," and each supplier
is aware that his profits depend on the behavior of each other supplier
in the industry. That is, when the market structure is oligopolistic. A
cartel is an attempt to find a cooperative equilibrium in an oligopolistic
market, and is thus a special case in oligopoly theory.
Oligopoly theory is intended to help us understand the behavior of
markets that are structurallywise located somewhere in between perfectly
competitive markets 'and markets dominated by a single monopoly. The
distance between these two extremes is huge, and there is consequently
room for a number of theories to explain the infinite number of points
between the two polar cases. The lack of success of the simple theories
on the relationship between market structure and behavior, theories
desinged to explain the whole continuum of possible market structures
and behaviors, has given rise to a bewildering number of theories based
on a priori behavioral assumptions built into formal models or on case-
study information. The closer the market structure assumed or observed
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is to one of the two polar cases the stronger and more plausible seem
the conclusions. Conclusions with respect to the dark area in between
the polar cases are more a common sense extension of the implication of
the polar cages, rather than the outcome of a generally-accepted, ade-
quate theory of oligopoly. Excellent reviews of the state of the art of
oligopoly theory are provided elsewhere [10,17].
Oligopolistic markets have provided a rich source of hypothesis to
be explored in formal models by the mathematically inclined, or to be
evaluated in case studies by patient empirically oriented researchers.
The classis models of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, and von Stackelberg
in which the reaction of each oligopolist to the action of each other
oligopolist is specified, constitute the core of the formal models
exploring the behavioral interdependencies between profit-maximizing
firms. Bishop's [4] more recent work on the nature of oligopolistic
warfare also explores the behavioral interdependencies between oligopol-
ists. By disregarding the behavioral complexities within the existing
oligopolistic market, the "limit-price" modelers simplify the world into
"existing firms" and "potential entrants." Such a simplification makes
it possible to focus on the interaction between the ways in which poten-
tial entrants perceive the response to entry by existing firms and the
behavior of the existing firms. Harrod, Edwards, Bain, Sylos-Labini,
Modigliani, and Bhagwati have among others developed this formal modell-
ing approach. Work in this tradition by Gaskins, Kamien and Schwartz,
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and Baron also includes an explicit treatment of uncertainty and of the
dynamics of the entry process. The above mentioned "limit-price-model"
simplification implies that this modelling approach should be regarded
as belonging to the family of monopoly models, rather than being included
in the portfolio of oligopolistic models.
The formal models have not, however, proven to be very useful to
students of particular markets, and their existence seems to have had a
negligible effect on applied research as exemplified by the research
reviewed on the experience of international commodity cartels. The lack
of applicability of formal models to the analysis of particular markets
has given rise to more "story-telling" on oligopolistic markets than on
any other subject in economic theory. Detailed studies of individual
industries and firms, studies on.how actual firms make actual decisions,
have provided the basis for our insight into oligopolistic markets more
than the formal models. The important characteristics of oligopoly
behavior are not captured by the conventional models.
More recent efforts have been made to construct simulation models
that incorporate elements of "story-telling" and of theoretical studies
in one analytic framework [13, 16]. Such models may provide us with
tools that possess some of the rigour of the formal modeling tradition
without giving up the richness of the "story-telling" approach.
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4.2 Cartel Behavior
The existence of OPEC as a formal organization to coordinate the oil
policies of the member states, to stabilize the price of oil, and to
assure a stable income to the producer countries makes it logical to
focus on the kinds of explicit collusive agreements that are labeled
cartel agreements.
The economic incentive to organize and operate a cartel is that
each individual member of an industry can make larger profits by receiv-
ing an appropriate share of the industry-wide monopoly profits than by
following any other market strategy. It is the benefits of being a
member rather than the disadvantages of being a non-member that is
the incentive to participate in a cartel.
Legal and political constraints may, however, make it impossible
for a cartel to reach the monopoly solution, in which case a cartel
will not necessarily be the profit-maximizing strategy for all suppliers
in an industry.
The existence of a cartel agreement does not solve the problem of
lack of a unique solution concept inherent in oligopolistic markets.
The lack c a unique profit maximizing solution tends to make cartel
agreements unstable. Contributing to the observed instability of car-
tels is the fact that in most countries collusive agreements constitute
criminal conspiracy. In the international domain the sovereignty of
the nation-state makes it impossible to legally enforce but also to
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prosecute collusive agreements initiated by inter-government action. The
cartel agreements of interest are consequently those that cannot be con-
trolled by court-enforced sanctions. It is no trivial task to discourage
individual cartel members from price cheating to capture additional sales
and profits when threatening believable and punitive retaliation is the
only means of enforcement.
The ease with which information about what rival firms.are doing
and what potential entrants might do is dependent on the number of firms
in an industry, and the similarity of the firms, including similarity
with respect to the perceptions of the present and to expectations about
the future. The smaller are the costs associated with gathering informa-
tion on the activities of rival firms, the smaller are the costs associ-
ated with enforcing a collusive agreement, and the greater will be the
ability of a group of firms to behave as a single monopoly.
If the colluding group of firms is heterogenous, the demand for the
industry's output is inelastic whereas the demand for any individual
firm's output is highly elastic, and the marginal production costs are
small compared to the cartel price, then there are considerable incentives
for each individual member to engage in price cheating. The same set of
characteristics provides also, however, strong incentives for a group of
firms to form a collusive agreement. The logical implication of the
different effects of the above-mentioned incentives on individual and on
joint behavior should be a fluctuating market price. If the cartel is
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reorganized every time cheating is detected, then the expectations of
the individual firms would be to make "a fast buck" before being dis-
covered, and then back to the old routine. Such a set of expectations
would imply ever increasing fluctuations over time.
4.3 Cartel Manaqement
The tasks of the managers of a cartel agreement are: (1) to design
a pricing strategy that will maximize the profits of the membership, (2)
to allocate production in the most efficient way, (3) to design a system
for allocating joint profits in a "fair" way, and (4) to police the car-
tel agreement such that no one can chisel to his own benefit and to the
detriment of some other cartel member.
For the purpose of this study we will primarily be concerned with
the first three tasks. The fourth will be briefly considered to indicate
the nature of this problem. The policing problem is a source of instab-
ility, and may as such be used as an argument in a "story" about cartel
breakdown. The policing problem is, however, considered to be beyond
the scope of the market characteristics that will be included in the
model. The pricing problem and the possible systems for allocating
production and profits will be explicitly included in the model.
A discussion of a cartel price as different from a monopoly price is
reported in an article by MacAvoy and Orr (M & 0) 141. Because it is
assumed in the model of this study that the "optimal" cartel price is the
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"monopoly" price, a relatively detailed discussion of the M & 0 pric-
ing-stragegy is included to demonstrate the "optimality" of the
"monopoly" price as the cartel price.
It is my hypothesis that the reason for cartel breakdowns is the
lack of appropriate systems for allocating production and profits. The
center of attention when studying the stability of a cartel-dominated
market should therefore be the division of profits. There are more
profits to be shared by the members of an industry when the joint profit
maximizing solution is chosen than in any other case. A separate section
will therefore be devoted to a focus on possible ways to divide profits
such that nobody will feel tempted to break the cartel policy for econo-
mic reasons. It is pointed out in the conclusion of the M & 0 article
that "A determinate one-price joint profit maximum seems to be necessary
to a 'general' analysis of the kind presented in this article." In the
above-mentioned section an attempt at such a "general" analysis is made.
4.3.1 Policing
Stigler has stated [18]:
"It is a well-established proposition that if any member of the agree-
ment can secretely violate it, he will gain larger profits than by
conforming to it. It is, moreover, surely one of the axioms of human
behavior that all agreements whose violation would be profitable to
the violator must be enforced ... Enforcement consists basically of
detecting significant deviations from the agreed upon prices. Once
detected, the deviations will tend to disappear because they are no
longer secret and will be matched by fellow conspirators if they are
not withdrawn ... The ease with which price-cutting is detected by
rivals is decisive."
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Stigler consequently formulated the policing of a collusive agreement
as a problem in the theory of information. He defined perfect collusion to
be "that no buyer changes sellers voluntarily. There is no competitive
price-cutting if there are no shifts of buyers among sellers." On the
basis of this definition and normal buyer behavior, Stigler has construc-
ted a probabilistic model of the market share of the various cartel members.
Significant deviations from expected market shares would then be an indica-
tion of price-cutting having taken place and such price-cutting would
consequently be detected.
Stigler's approach to stabilizing a cartel is thus to closely super-
vise the market share of each participant to make it impossible to secretly
violate the cartel agreement, thereby making cheating unprofitable and
destroying the destabilizing expectations mentioned above.
4.3.2 Pricinq
On the basis of a model of an industry assuming time lags in the flow
of information, linearity of all relations, variable costs to be zero, and
division of the market for a homogenous good equally among several sellers,
M & 0 demonstrates that the optimal pricing strategy for the cartel in the
presence of cheating is the following: "The cartel should set its price
to yield maximum joint profit for the loyal members, given that a cheater
.s maximizin his own rofits in the ace of he cartel policy."
In the M & 0 analysis there are n+i firms, and the market demand (in
units per unit of time) is given by:
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Q = (n+l) - (n+l)SP ,>O (4.1)
when each firm charges the same price P. The demand for a cheater's out-
put is given by
Ql = - P + y(P-P 1 ) Y->
(4.2)
and the loyal firms' demand is
Q-1 = n - nP - 6(P-P1) O<6<y (4.3)
The resulting profit functions are respectively
rc = P[n - nP - 6(P-P1)]
and
1 = Pl[a - P + Y(P-Pl ) ]
and the reaction functions are given by the conditions
c -
which aPlies that
which implies that
PlO [ + ( - )P]/2y (4.4a)
is the equation of the reaction of the cheater to the cartel price changes
and
P1 = [-n + 2(nS + 6)PO]/6 (4.4b)
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is the reaction function of the cartel. M & 0 demonstrate that the inter-
section of the reaction functions results in two equilibrium prices that
are positive, lower than the collusive price, and are stable according to
the standard definition of stability.
The fact that we are discussing a homogeneous product implies that all
suppliers of the product can charge no more than any other supplier if
positive sales are to be obtained. This implies that the loyal firms and
the cheater will have to end up charging an identical price. If the price
they end up with is lower than the collusive price, everybody is worse off
than in the initial market solution assuming that each firm again will
supply the same share of the market, which seems likely given the symmetry
of the firms. Any decision rule that results in a solution unfavorable to
all firms is obviously not stabilizing. A return to the previously oint
solution might take place or further competition might emerge. If the
suppliers are differentiated by location then segmentation of markets is
possible and the conclusion that all suppliers would charge the same price
under joint profit maximization is due to the particular assumptions of
M & 0, namely that there are (n+l) identical firms in (n+l) identical
markets. The market also has to be segmented for two groups of suppliers
selling an identical product to charge different prices without nullifying
the sales of either group. The general conclusion is, therefore, that the
i & 0 interpretation of their cartel stabilizing strategy will not result
in a stable cartel-dominated market.
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The joint profit maximizing price, the "monopoly" price, is the
"optimal" cartel price. The system for allocating production and profits
should be designed to discourage cheating, as pointed out in the next
section. A cartel should never fiddle with the price once the joint
profit maximizing price-path has been reached.
4.3.3 Allocation of Production and Profits
The demand for an industry's output is
Q = Q(P) (4.5)
The number of suppliers in this industry is fixed due to an absolute
barrier to entry. The total cost, C, of producing the industry output
depends on the level of output, Q, as well as the distribution of produc-
tion, W, among the firms:
C = C(W,Q) (4.6)
The joint profit-maximizing solution is that of a multi-plant monopolist,
i.e., the price, quantity, and distribution of production resulting from
equalizing marginal revenue with marginal cost in the plants being oper-
ated to produce the monopoly quantity. If an industry behaves like a
multi-plant monopolist the level of profits generated will be large enough
to compensate all the members sufficiently to make price cheating unattrac-
tive. if we stick to the rule that the loyal members of a cartel will
choose the price and quantity that will maximize their profits as a price-
taker, it is possible to design a system for division of profits that will
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make the potential cheater's profits at least as large by sticking to the
cartel policy as by behaving as a price-taker.
If we let ir denote the profits of a cheater when behaving as a price-
taker and the loyal firms reacted to the defection by maximizing profits,
and * denotes the joint industry profits in the case of perfect collusion,
the optimal system of division of profits, WP, is such that:
WPi * > r* (4.7a)
or
WP. = W1 (4.7b)
This system of division of profits removes the economic incentive to
chisel. It can easily be shown that the loyal firms of a cartel are always
better off by compensating a potential cheater in this way than by letting
him defect and then maximizing profits without him. If both the potential
cheater and the loyal firms are better off under this profit sharing
arrangement, everybody is better off. If we deonte the profits of the
loyal firms in the presence of a cheater as r*, it is sufficient to
demonstrate that the following inequality holds:
(1 -) * 2* ,,*j(4.8a)
or
'*- - -i (4.8b)
or
*T >-i + ' (4.8c)
_T >ii
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The inequality (4.8c) holds by definition of 7r*. r* was defined as
the maximum profits that could be extracted from the industry. * is
therefore at least as large as the total profits resulting from any other
price/production combination. The implication is that the system of
division of profits as defined above improves the lot of all cartel members
from any other possible market strategy not involving stupidity on the part
of some industry members. The economic incentive to breaking the collusive
contract is therefore removed.
The general conclusion with respect to the use of price and quotas for
stabilizing pruposes is that a cartel should focus on how to allocate
monopoly profits to remove incentives to cheating and never fiddle with
the joint profit maximizing price.
4.4 Conclusion
The focus of this study is on a particular market, the international
petroleum market. The existing institutional environment of that market
makes it plausible to focus on cooperative market solutions in general,
and on possible cartel coalitions in particular. Given the state of the
art of oligopoly models assuming cooperative market behavior, a simple
monopoly model is the most plausible when describing the price behavior
of a given colluding group. Conventional oligopoly models are not useful
when dealing with the problem of which firms are likely to form a collusive
agreement under which circums ances. A more detailed study, "story-
telling," is needed to hypothesize which coalitions are likely to emerge
under the different circumstances the industry may have to face. A
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specific analysis of the membership of OPEC is needed to construct a
plausible set of intracartel reaction functions. The way production and
profits is allocated among the cartel membership is a good proxy for a
measure of the desirability, and hence also of the feasibility of various
cartel compositions.
The need to combine formal modelling aspects with informal "story-
telling" makes a simulation model the most ambitious approach that can be
made to the analysis of a particular market without sacrificing the
empirical validity of the analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MODEL REPRESENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM MARKET
The purpose of this study is to develop a framework for analysis of
the likely degree of and the implications of non-competitive behavior to
be observed in the international petroleum market. The focus of this
study is therefore on the market strategies that may be pursued by the
world's oil exporters on a joint or on an individual basis.
The shortcomings of formal models designed to analyze oligopolistic
markets imply, as pointed out in Chapter 4, that the structure of a model
designed to analyze a particular oligopolistic market should be flexible
enough to combine features of formal modelling with informal "story-
telling." As it is our intent to study the behavior of the market as it
actually exists rather than calculating "efficient" or "optimal" patterns
of market development, and because there are many time-dependent relations
that are important to include, it was decided to develop a simulation
model. A simulation model easily permits formulations of a number of
exporter decision rules or exporter market strategies. The form of the
relationships or of the equations of the model was chosen such that an
explicit analytic expression for the market clearing price consistent with
each combination of exporter strategies could be derived.. No numerical
or "optimizing" subroutines are therefore needed to solve for a market
clearing price path. The structure of the model and the functional
relationships are constructed to explore the implications of pricing
behavior reflecting a monopolistic market structure, a competitive market
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strategy, or any combinations of the two. The change in the set of 
decision rules being applied in each period makes the model evolutionary in
the sence that the price behavior of the market may change from period to
period.
There is a complex transportation network serving the international
petroleum market. A number of different crude oil qualities and petroleum
products are flowing in international trade. For the purpose of this
study, however, it was decided that the costs in terms of increased model
complexity would outweigh the benefits of gained insights by explicitly
representing this transportation and products network. It was decided to
treat oil as a homogenous product and to disregard the geocraphic location
of exporters and importers. The international petroleum market is hence
treated as a "bathtub," therefore the label the "bathtub" model.
5.1 The Importer Regions
The international petroleum market is presently the marginal source of
energy in the world. The international price of petroleum determines the
price that can be charged for all fuels, and hence also the quantity
supplied of all other fuels. The demand facing the world's exporters is
thus a residual demand. The "bathtub" model consists of such a residual
demand ramework.
in the model development e will deal with a group of net importers,
denoted by the index i, and with a set of exporters, j. laie define E as
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total demand for energy in region i in year t, and let P be a vector of
past and present energy prices. The relationship between the international
price of petroleum and the total demand for energy in region i in year t
can be then represented as
E = Ei (P,t). (5.1)
The market share of oil, in region i in period t, Mt, is likewise a
function of past and present prices in the international market,
Mt = Mi(P,t), (5.2)
as is also the indigenous supply of oil in region i in year t, Si, where
S S i(P,t). (5.3)
The resulting demand for imports to region i in year t, Dt, is consequently
~~~~~~~~~t t i
t = Di(P,t) = E Mt St (5.4)
In the present version of the model the world is divided into four
importing regions, i = 1, .., 4. They are Western Europe, Japan, United
States, and the rest of the world (not including USSR, Eastern Europe, and
China which are included in the model as net exporters only).
The relationships defined in Equations 5.1 to 5.3 are complex. A
simplification of these relationships is required to solve for the market
clearing price and quantity even in the case of perfect competition. As
we will focus on non-competitive market behavior, including monopoly
behavior, in which case the first derivative of the residual demand
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function together with the first derivative of the monopoly unit's total
cost function will determine the market price, even more simplified ver-
sions of the relationships defined above are required. To be able to test
a number of ways of structuring the behavioral characteristics of the
various participants in the international petroleum market, approximations
were made to the above relationships such that the system of equations
representing the international market could be solved analytically rather
than having to solve the system of equations by applying some more costly
numerical method. A set of linear approximations to the regional oil/
energy relationships was therefore constructed.
5.1.1 Price Expectations
An important characteristic of the oil/energy sector is the long lead
times due to the capital intensity of the sector. That is, a number of
periods is required to adjust the capital equipment of the oil/energy
producing and consuming sectors to a significant change in price. The
oil/energy producers and consumers will hence adjust their capital equip-
ment to the market price they expect to prevail when the equipment will be
on stream some time in the future. The sophistication of these investors
may differ a great deal, and there is consequently room for a number of
rules representing how expectations with respect to the future price level
are formed. Given the state of the art of predicting the future and a
strong desire to simplify as much as possible such expectaticns rules, the
present price was chosen as a first approximation to the expected price. A
more complex expression for the expected price is introduced in Sec.5.2.9.
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If we define "the long-term" to be the number of periods required for
a complete adjustment of the capital equipment of the oil/energy sector to
a significant change in the price of oil/energy, then the postulated
linear approximations and the assumption that the expected price is equal
to the present price imply that the long-term relationships between the
variables characterizing the oil energy sector and the past, current, and
expected oil/energy price will be of a simple linear form with current
price representing the price vector. The long-term total demand for
energy in region i in year t, Ei, (where the "bar" above a variable indi-
cates its long-term value), is consequently:
Et= elt - e 2ipt (5.5)
Equation (5.5) hence represents the quantity of energy that would have
been consumed in a given year and at a given price if energy consuming
equipment could have been adjusted instantaneously to any price level.
The price-slope coefficient, e2i, was simply estimated by calculat-
ing the post-adjustment energy consumption level for two different price
levels under identical assumptions about income and other effects, and
then dividing the absolute difference between the consumption levels by
the absolute difference between the two price levels thereby constructing
a linear energy demand junction. The time-dependent intercept coeffi-
cient, eli, was estimated by calculating an initial intercept in a year
in which the actual and the long-term market solution was assumed to
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coincide (the actual and the long-term solution was assumed to coincide
in 1973 at $3), and then extrapolating this initial intercept at a rate
such that the level of long-term energy consumption would have increased
at the rate of growth of the economy for a given price level. That is,
an income elasticity of one is assumed when calculating the location of
the long-term energy demand function in each period.
To get from the simplified long-term relationships to the short-term
relationships, the short-term being one year, a process by which the mar-
ket would move from one long-term equilibrium to another was assumed.
This process was assumed to be completely described by the length and form
of a distributed lags function. There is a number of distributed lags
functions that are frequently used by economists. The reasoning behind
the ten year moving average applied here is very simple. The cost of oil/
energy has traditionally constituted only a fraction of total production
costs. Even a significant increase in the cost of oil/energy will conse-
quently not make existing plants and equipment instantaneously obsolete;
a gradual process of replacement of depreciated assets with "energy-tuned"
equipment is more likely to be observed. If we assume that a ten-year
straight line depreciation rule is a plausible approximation to the aver-
age industry-wide way of depreciating and replacing assets, then a ten-
year moving average is a plausible approximation to the process by which
the economy will adjust itself to a significant change in the price of
oil/energy.
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In the non-oil energy sector and the oil-sector there is a number of
short-, intermediate-, and long-term measures that will be made in response
to a significant increase in the price of oil/energy. Secondary and ter-
tiary recovery methods are applied to increase production from existing
oil fields in the short term. Opening up of new coal mines and production
from new oil fields following increased development drilling are expected
in the intermediate term. Nuclear plants and new oil fields will come on
stream in the longer term. We may therefore assume that the response
process of the energy producing sector is similar in kind to the process
of adjusting energy consuming equipment. The apparent similarities of
the adjustment processes made another simplifying assumption plausible,
namely that the same distributed lags function is a plausible approxima-
tion to the adjustment process of all the oil/energy related sectors.
With the possible exception of Japan, all the regional units are suffi-
ciently aggregated and the number of energy-related options in each region
is sufficiently similar, even if the weights given to the various options
may differ, that the same distributed lags function also apply to all the
consumer regions. That is, the adjustment process of all sectors in all
the regions is assumed to be identical.
5.1.2 Linear Market Relationships
By imposing an adjustment process linking the long-term to the short-
term on the long-term demand for energy function, Equation (5.5), the
following linear approximation to the relationship between past and
present prices and the demand for energy in region i in year t emerges:
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t - 2.~t kk
Et elt e2 
1i i i xp
k=t-K
E xk = 1. (5.6a)
k=t-K
k is the length of the adjustment process and the X's are the annual
weights of the adjustment process. The intercept of this linear relation-
ship is assumed to grow such that energy consumption for a given price
will grow at the rate of growth of the economy in region i, G.
t kpk
t t-_ t-l t k k
E2 = el 1 + Et x Gt e2i Xp (5.6)
i i =. (5.6)k=t-K
The same procedure was also used to construct short-term market share-
and indigenous supplies- relationships, even if the intercepts of the
latter two relationships were estimated differently from that of the total
demand for energy. In the case of the market share relationship the
fraction of oil in total demand for energy was also simply linearized.
According to the studies made by OECD and FEA [2,8], the market share of
oil is relatively insensitive to the price of oil within a fairly wide
price range. The intercept of the linear market share relationship con-
sequently dominates this relationship. A linear approximation to the
relationship between past and present prices and the market share of oil
does not have some of the properties we would expect from a market share
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relationship. That is, if the price of oil fell to zero in a linear
market share equation the market share of oil would not automatically
converge towards one, and if the price of oil increased to infinity then
the market share of oil would not converge towards zero. Given the
insensitivity of the market share of oil to the price of oil within the
price range we consider of most relevance from an empirical point of view
($4 to $15 in 1975 dollars), as indicated by the studies of OECD and FEA,
the linear market share approximation seems to be a relatively costless
simplification. The time-horizon of this study is 1990. In the longer-
term we would expect the market share of oil to be more price sensitive
and for a study of the longer-term implications of a change in the price
of oil a linear approximation to the market share relationship would be
inappropriate.
When an initial market share intercept, mOi had been calculated
according to the procedure outlined above in the text to Equation (5.5),
then an exogenous growth rate, G, was calculated by solving for the
annual rate of change of the market share of oil in the 1972 to 1985
period consistent with OECD's $3 constant price of oil scenario. GMi
represents the expected trend in the market share of oil at continued low
energy prices. This assumed growth rate thus tends to bias upwards the
market share of oil for prices above $3. The long-term price effect was
estimated as25 was e2i in Equation (5.5) and is incorporated in the slope
M2. The linear approximation to the market share of oil in region i in
year t is consequently:
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Mt = mO i(+GM ) t - m2. k A p (5.7)
k=1.3 Indigenous Supt-K
5.1.3 Indigenous Supplies
When a promising geological basin is discovered or when the price of
oil suddenly increases we would expect the oil industry to go through
three stages, the first being an intense exploration and development
effort to get production facilities on stream. Once the production
facilities are on stream, we would expect a higher level of production to
be sustained for some years before the newly developed fields are being
gradually depleted. If the higher price level results in a high rate of
discoveries, aggregate production does not necessarily have to fall. In
the linear approximation to the indigenous supply function, it was assumed
that the price would affect the future level of plateau production in the
various regions. It was further assumed that development and gradual
starting up of new production facilities, the length of the.plateau produc-
tion period, as well as the rate of decline of production following the
period of peak production could be represented by extrapolating the inter-
cept at different exocenous rates over the three typical production stages.
The initial equilibrium intercept, sO i, is hence being extrapolated at a
price-independent rate of change, dependent only on the stage in the
production process at which the region is producing. The linear approxi-
mation to the short-term relationship between past and present prices and
indigenous supplies in region i in year t is:
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t _ tttkS = s(1-d)t + s2i Akpk (5.8)
k=t-K
By summarizing the regional demand for imports, the residual demand
facing the exporter in year t, Dt emerges as:
t
Dt d + I [-kxdxpk + k x d3 x (pk)2] (5.9)
k=t-K
where t t t-1 t t-t
d= [(el + E xGi)(Om (l+GM.) )sO. (l-d)t ]
I i i . 1 1 1
dt = [e2 x mOi(l+GM.)t + (elt-l+Et-l x Gt)xm2 + X2
d = (e2 i x m2 i)
The international market clearing price can then be determined from
the accounting identity of Equation (5.10) below, stating that the price
has to clear the market in the sense that at that price the level of
exports in period t, St, is equal to the level of imports in the same
period:
Dt = St (5.10)
As the focus of this study is on the behavioral options open to the
world's exporters rather than the policies of the importer governments,
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Equation (5.10) is given in its "pure" form. That is, no policy instru-
ments are explicitly included in the equation representing the worldwide
demand for imports. To incorporate and to assess the traditional importer
country policy options like tariffs, quotas, consumer taxes, and producer
subsidies, only minor modifications of the representation of the consumer
regions are required.
5.2 The Exporters
The behavioral options open to the world's oil exporters are in the
following represented by a set of pricing or production strategies that
the exporters may choose to, or have to, follow on an ir;:ividual or a
joint basis. An explicit analytic expression for the market clearing
price or quantity consistent with the various exporter strategies is
deducted.
Two versions of the "bathtub" model have been constructed. To asses
the significance of or the market implications of the behavior of some
stable collusive combinations of exporter countries, a simple version of
the "bathtub" model was constructed. In this simple version of the model
one exporter unit only is explicitly represented. The composition of the
exporting group may be changed, however, by transferring countries from
the exporter unit to the unit representing the rest of the world's indige-
nous suppliers, or vice versa. indigenous suppliers are assumed to behave
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as price-takers. It is thereby possible to combine price-taker behavior
on the part of some exporters with any of the below-mentioned strategies
to be played by the other exporters even in this simple model version.
The heterogeneity of the exporting countries and the theoretical as
well as empirical instability of oligopolistic markets imply that it is
unlikely that all the exporters will follow the same strategy. A more
complex version of the "bathtub" model, the cartel version, was therefore
constructed to trace the evolution of the international petroleum market
resulting from the changing behavior of the major exporter units. By
allowing four exporter units to change decision rules in any given period,
the cartel version of the "bathtub" model covers a very wide range of
possible market solutions. A number of experiments could be performed,
however, by using the simple model version. The simple model should
therefore be considered a cost-saving version of the cartel model.
5.2.1 Static Perfect Competition
"Static Perfect Competition" means that the exporter unit behaves as
a mypoic price-taker. That is, the exporter unit produces the quantity
that equalizes marginal cost and the current price. The marginal cost
function is the inverse of the competitive supply function. A linear
approximation to the relationship between the competitive supply level
from exporter j in period t, S, and past and present prices was con-
structed in the same way as the linear approximations to the supply
functions indigenous to the regional consumer units.
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t sO. t ) , s2 1 1
= s(l-d)t + s2j (6 p ) (5.11)
l3=t-L
where t 1
1l=t-L
To be able to write the expression for the market clearing price in a
more compact form, we may simplify the expressions for residual demand and
exporter supplies by incorporating all terms that do not involve the current
price in a constant term. The constant term of the residual demand function
in period t, DLt, is consequently:
DLt = dt + (-Xkdkpk+Xkd3(pk)2
k=t-K
Equation (5.9) can then be written as:
Dt = D- td2pt+ Xtd3(pt) (5.9a)
By defining unsubscribed supply coefficients to represent aggregate exporter
supplies, and by introducing an analogous constant term, SLt,
t-1 1
SLt = sO(l-d) t + s2 t 61pl
1 =t-L
Equation (5.11) can be written in a compact form representing aggre-
gate competitive exporter supplies
St = SLt + 6ts2pt (5.la)
-111-
By setting equation (5.9) equal to (5.11a) and solving the system
with respect to pt, the market equilibrating price in the case of static
perfect competition, p, is found to be:
t X d?+6 sz d/ s2 2 __ (5.12)
1 2Xtd 1/ d X d3
2Xtd 3 3 3
5.2.2 Static MonoDoly
The static monopoly strategy is to charge the price that will equal-
ize the marginal revenue of the long-term residual demand function, MRt '
with long-term marginal production costs, MC That is, the static mono-
polist disregards the form of the adjustment process of the consumer
markets and also user cost. The monopolist does, however, exploit the
inertia of the consumer markets by extrapolating the intercept of the
residual demand function at the anticipated rate of growth of the economy
K periods hence, where is the number of periods needed for adjustment
of the consumer markets, and then choosing the current price to be the
price that equalizes marginal revenue and marginal cost in this enlarged
future market. This pricing rule is labeled "static monopoly" because it
is similar to the pricing rule a monopolist would follow in a market that
adjusts instantaneously to a change in price and where there are no compli-
cations resulting from resource limitations. The "static monopoly"
pricing rule defined here as .ell as the other decision rules specified in
the following are not deducted from maximization on the part of the
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exporter. The decision rules are plausible approximating rules given our
knowledge of the objectives and of the likely behavior of the exporters.
Actual revenue optimization would probably imply more exploitation of the
inelasticity of the short-term demand function. That is, a higher price
in the period following the monopolization of the market and then a
decreasing price converging towards some long-term rising monopoly price-
path would probably generate higher revenues than the monopoly-rules of
this study. It is considered more likely, however, that the producer
countries, in the case of continued collusion, will follow some pricing
rule that will result in a smoothly rising price, rather than follow a
pricing rule that will deliberately produce price fluctuations to maxi-
mize short-term gains or to discourage potential entrants into the oil/
energy market.
The construction of a set of plausible decision rules on the basis of
some knowledge of the objectives of the market participants rather than
deduce the decision rules on the basis of a theory of profit-maximizing
behavior is the major distinction between the "behavioral" approach made
in this study and the traditional studies of the behavior of market parti-
cipants. The inexistence of a theory of profit maximizing behavior in
oligopolistic markets, and the number of plausible decision rules that
might be observed in such markets make a "behavioral" rather than a
rigorously Formal approach more useful.
The quadratic residual demand function of Equation (5.9) and the
monopoly's marginal cost function of the form of the inverse of Equation
-113-
(5.11) imply that an equation of third degree would have to be solved to
find the price at which marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. To
avoid this problem, Equation (.9) was linearized in the following way.(The
"bar" signifies that it is the long-term version of Equation (5.9) that is
being considered. That is, no lags are included).
t = dY - dp d(t d (dt - d)Pt
1 2 3 1 2
dt - (d - dpt'l)pt t t (5.13)
1 2 3 1 4
DL d1 d 4P
As d3 is small and as pt-1 is close to pt on the "static monopoly"
price-path or any other "smooth" path, the approximation is fairly accurate.
The empirical estimation of d3 shows as reported in Chapter 6 that d3 is
less than .04. The linear residual demand function, D, is to be extrapo-
lated K periods according to the "static monopoly" pricing rule. The
resulting marginal revenue of the long-term extrapolated residual demand
function is consequently:
dt+K 2dt 4 (5.14)
The long-term version of the competitive supply cure is of the form:
st = slit + s2p (5.15a)
3y taking the inverse of this relationship and keeping in mind that
quantity is formulated as a function of price rather than price as a
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function of quantity, the following expression for long-term marginal
production costs can be deducted:
st+K t
c 1 xd 4
t+K xdtd xd
S2
(d~)24 pt
S2
(5.15)
By solving for the price that equalizes equations (5. 1i) and (5.15), the
"static monopoly"
t
P2=
price is found to be:
t+K d t+x dt
dt+K S1 4 xd 4d +
-1 s~ s2
t + (d )2d a4 S2
5.2.3 Income Stabilization
Income stabilization simply means that the exportess will
(5.16)
supply a
quantity, S, such that the resulting income
revenue level,
is equal to some target
t
I .
t - It
3 t (5.17)
By combining equations (5.9) and (5.13) , the short-term linearized resi-
dual demand function may be written as
=t DL_- X tt .t
L 4
The market rice resulting from equalizing equations (5.12) and (5.9b) is
consequently
(5.9b)
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t D tDt
P3 2Xd t
4
(5.18)
5.3.4 Production Stabilization
The exporters may decide to produce some fixed quantity in a given
*t t
period or decide on a fixed production path over time, D . Supply S4 is
then: *
S4 = D t (5.19)
With a fixed supply path the quadratic demand function of Equation (5.9)
can be used without causing analytical problems when determining the
market price. The resulting market equilibrium price is
t
Pt 2
'4 2d4 
(5.20)
5.2.5 Target Pricing
When the group of exporters decide on a common pricing strategy over
time, this strategy is labeled "target pricing." The target price path,
TPt, may be any price path on which consensus has been reached. The
production strategy that goes along with target pricing is to produce
whatever the market will take at the target price without worrying about
how actual production is allocated among the exporters.
When the price is exogenously determined to be TP', then the market
equilibrating quantity is:
-116-
S = DLt-Xtdt TPt + Xtd3(Tpt)2 (5.21)5 2 (
Neither the desired income-path of the income stabilizing strategy,
the desired production-path of the production stabilizing strategy, nor
the desired price-path of the target pricing strategy are determined
inside the model. They are not a result of any analysis within the model.
5.2.6 Exhaustible-Resource Competition
The exporters may try to aniticpate all future prices for their non-
renewable resource by estimating the price they will obtain for the last
unit of the resource, and then determine their present production such that
the price today is the net present value equivalent of the ultimate price
[6.]. The ultimate price is defined to be the price of the "backstop
technology," PB, which is the cost of producing a substitute product rest-
ing on a very abundant resource base. If we define r as the discount
factor, then the net present value equivalent of the backstop tecnnology
price is uniquely determined if we can determine the number of periods
until exhaustion takes place. That a resource base has been exhausted at
a iven rice means that the marginal cost of extracting an additional
unit from the resource base is higher than the given price. The resource
base is therefore a function of the backstop technology price.
Determining the number of periods until exhaustion, N, implies solving
analytically the following equation with respect to T, the exhaustion date:
R = Dtd (5.22)
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where R is the level of recoverable reserves consistent with a backstop
technology price of PB and Dt is the quantity consumed at any point in
time, given the fact that the price charged is the net present value equi-
valent of the backstop-technology price. The simplest and most naive way
of determing N would be to divide R by D, the initial level of consump-
tion. This procedure implicitly assumes a perfectly inelastic demand for
the resource, and a zero income elasticity. The elasticity assumptions of
this study are different from zero. An attempt was therefore made to con-
struct an expression for N that would reflect non-zero elasticity assump-
tions. The problems we have to face to arrive at an analytic expression
for N when demand grows with time and is also price responsive can be
illustrated by formulating the problem using the continuous version of the
simplified long-term linear demand function of Equation (5.13) as a short-
term demand function. That is, instantaneous adjustment of the market is
assumed. Demand, Dt, is then a linear function of price in the following
way:
Dt =aleBt- 2p (5.23)
1 2P1
where al and a2 are appropriately adjusted versions of dl and d4 in Equa-
tion (5.13), and is an assumed rate of market growth. pt is defined to
pt = PB e -r(T -t), and
N = T-t.
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Equation (5.22) then becomes:
R =t ale t - aPBer(T-t)dt (5.24)
t
Equation (5.24) can be solved numerically, but it does not seem to be
possible to deduct an explicit analytic expression for N or T-t even in
this over-simplified case.
As stated earlier, the simulation framework being constructed here is
based on explicit analytic expressions for all endogenous variables.
Approximating "behavioral" decision rules have been constructed to keep
the model framework simple. More complex sub-routines to optimize or to
solve numerically some segment of the model have been replaced by these
"behavioral" decision rules. Tie same procedure has been followed to get
around the Equation (5.24) problem. By assuming that all the "exhaustible-
resource competitors" expect the same rate of growth of the economy, agree
on the income elasticity of demand as well as on the price-elasticity of
demand, and also expect the market price to grow at the rate of interest as
the price is expected to follow the path of the net present value equival-
ent of the back-stop technology price, then all competitors will expect the
market to grow at the same rate if it is also assumed that the market price
initially was equal to the net present value equivalent of the back-stop
technology. The expected rate of growth of the market, EG, is simply a
-unction of the elasticity of income, ., the expected rate of growth of the
economy, G, the price elasticity, E, and the rate of interest, r, as price
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will increase at the rate of interest on the expected price path,
EG = I x GE + E x r. (5.25)
The assumption that the expectations of all competitors with regard to the
four variables on the right hand side of Equation (5.25) are identical,
will produce an expected growth rate as can be illustrated in a simple
example. If the competitive suppliers expect the economy to grow at a
rate of 5 per year, assume an income elasticity of one, a rate of interest
of 10%, and a price-elasticity of -0.1, then they would expect that quan-
tity consumed in each period to increase by 4%.
The expected growth rate of the quantity consumed, EG, can be used to
solve for the number of periods until exhaustion. N was determined from
the following set of equations:
N 0 t
R = DO(l+EG)t (5.26a)
i=t
R (1+ E G ) N 1
R =D° [(l+EG)l] (5.26b)
EG
.[EGxR
' LOG +EG (5.26c)
The resulting market price is:
pt PB (5.27)
(I+r)
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How good Nt is an approximation to the number of periods until exhaus-
tion depends on the level of reserves compared to present production, the
price-path prior to the p6 - path, and how fast the market will adjust to
a new price path.
5.2.7 Exhaustible-Resource Monopoly
Under static monopoly the optimal price and production is determined
by equalizing marginal revenue and current marginal production costs.
Under exhaustible-resource monopoly the net present value equivalent of
the ultimate price is substituted for current marginal production costs.
That is, the monopoly price and production are determined by equalizing
marginal revenue and the net present value equivalent of the backstop
technology price, which is a plausible approximation to the Hotelling-
condition in the monopoly case, namely that the difference between mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost shall grow at the rate of interest [6],
when marginal production costs are "close" to zero.
The number of periods until exhaustion was again estimated assuming an
expected rate of market growth determined by the net effect of the growth
of the economy and the increase in price resulting from the increased size
of the market and by the fact that the shadow price of the resource which
is substituted for current marginal production costs is assumed to grow at
the rate of interest. It is further assumed that the elasticity of demand
in the monopoly case is equal to minus one. In the simple static monopoly
case with zero marginal costs then the monopoly price is determined such
that the elasticy of demand at the monopoly price is minus one. This does
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not hold in the case of positive marginal costs or on the Hotelling mono-
poly path. But it is a fair approximation to the elasticity of demand also
in the latter two cases as long as marginal costs are small or the number
of periods until exhaustion is large. If marginal costs are small or the
number of periods until exhaustion is large then-the monopolist's cost
conditions are close to the zero cost case from which the minus one
elasticity assumption is deducted.
From these assumptions the monopolist's expected growth of consumption,
MG, can be estimated in the case of "exhaustible-resource monopoly pricing"
by determining the net change in quantity consumed in each periQd, result-
ing from the income effect and the price effect on the monopoly price path.
Equation (5.26c) then becomes
LOG[ MG +1]
N LOGlG + ]G) (5.28)
The monopoly price resulting from the equalization of marginal revenue and
the monopoly net present value equivalent of the ultimate price is:
t dl +[PB/(l+r;' x d4
7 t (5.29)
2 x d4
In the present versions of the model the monopoly price is chosen to be the
higher price of the static monopoly price and the exhaustible-resource
monopoly price. The exhaustible-resource monopoly price would be higher
than the static monopoly price if the net present value of the back-stop
technology price, the present opportunity cost of the resource, is higher
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than marginal production costs. The price reflecting the higher opportu-
nity cost is thus chosen as the monopoly price. The upper limit of the
monopoly price is the price of the backstop technology.
5.2.8 Cartel Pricing
The world's exporters are not a very homogenous group. A model inten-
ded to identify and analyze the implications of various oil exporter strat-
egies should therefore be able to incorporate and deal with this hetero-
geneity. The cartel version of the "bathtub" model allows individual
exporters and exporter sub-groups to follow different strategies. The
oligopolistic structure of the international petroleum market necessitates
an explicit representation of the various strategies that might be designed
to allocate production and income among the major oil exporters.
The lack of a unique solution concept for oligopolistic markets neces-
sitates more assumptions than in either the competitive case or n the
monopoly case to solve for an equilibrating price. There is no uniquely
rational behavior that can be specified for an individual oligopolist,
since the most profitable behavior for one seller depends on the response
of the others. The fact that oligopolists fully recognize their mutual
dependence is not sufficient for a unique solution. A unique solution or
an equilibrating price implies that expected and actual outcomes are
identical. Expec-ations play a crucial role in oligopolistic markets. To
simulate the behavior of price in an oligopolistic market it is therefore
necessary to specify the expected and actual reaction of all other oligop-
polists to one oligopolist's behavior. With three or more oligopolists
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the possible relevance of coalitions among some subgroups constitutes a
major complication. The number of possible coalitions increases rapidly
with the number of individual oligopolists. To narrow down the range of
possible market solutions the OPEC-cartel is collapsed into three indivi-
daul units and two aggregate units. The individual units are unit one,
U1, consisting of Iraq, Niqeria, Indonesia, and Gabon; unit two, U2, con-
sisting of Iran, Algiers, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and unit three, U3,
consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya. The reasoning behind
the selection of these units is indicated in Section 6.4. The two aggre-
gate units are unit four, U4, consisting of U1, U2, and U3; and unit five,
U5, consisting of U2 and U3. All other exporters are included in a
separate unit, the competitive exporter fringe.
The demand for cartel output in period t, RDt, is the difference
between the worldwide demand for imports in period t, Dt , and what the
exporter fringe can or wants to supply in period t, SEt.
RDt = Dt - SEt (5.30)
The exporter fringe may also follow non-pricetaker strategies like income
or production stabilization, but it is assumed that the fringe will not
participate in any explicitly colluding agreements. The composition of
the above-mentioned units may, of course, be altered. For the sake of
simplicity in the presentation, and to avoid pretending that the possible
market sol.tions defined below are not dependent on the composition of the
units, the compositions of the units will not be changed in the following.
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All the above-mentioned characteristics of the exporter group as a
whole apply to each exporter subunit, and hence also to the exporters that
may form a collusive agreement to extract a monopoly rent. There are, how-
ever, additional characteristics of each cartel member that may or may not
influence the location and the stability of a cartel determined market
solution. The production capacity of unit j in period t, C, which is a
function of past and expected prices, P, development and production costs,
MCj, time, t, and any cartel policy on prorationing of capacity, cc,
C = Cj (P,MCj, t, cc) (5.31)
is likely to influence the behavior of cartel unit j.
The production allocated to unit j in period t, Q, which is a
function of the total demand for cartel output in period t, RDt, and the
cartel-determined quota-system in period t, Wt
Q= Qj (RD , Wt ) (5.32)
as well as the associated production profits, and the income requirements
of unit j, are major determinants of the desirability of the cartel solu-
tion or of the strength of the disintegrating forces working on the cartel.
The income requirements of unit j, IRt, are simply assumed to be a function
J
of time, t.
IR = IR. (t) (5.33)
J 3
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5.2.8.1 Quotas
Production and profits may be allocated in a number of ways. The
quota-systems described below have been chosen on the basis of what might
be acceptable to the OPEC-membership and on the basis of what economic
theory says about the way production and profits should be allocated among
a colluding group.
The simplest possible way of allocating production and profits is to
decide on an historic base year, and then fix the future market shares at
the base year level. If we denote the base year O, then an historic quota
system, WH, implies that cartel member j will be allocated the following
market share:
0
WH 3- (5.34)
Wj -RD 0
Production profits are retained by the individual members. That is, no
side-payments are being made.
The fact that some OPEC countries have a high need for income may make
plausible a quota-system based on the income requirements of the member-
ship. That is, the market share allocated to producer j in period t
when based on income requirements, WF, is proportional to his relative
share of total cartel income requirements in period t, IRc .
IR-
WF- = (5.35)J c
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If the cartel could allocate production as a multi-plant monopolist,
then production should be allocated such that the marginal cost of produc-
ing each cartel member's last unit, MC , was equalized, and equal to the
t t
marginal revenue of the cartel as a whole, MRt. WE is determined such
c j
that
MCt. MRt =1,2,3. (5.36)
In this multi-plant scenario profits are allocated according to the econo-
mic power of each unit as defined in Section 4.2.2 and in Equation (5.37)
below. If we denote the total profits of the colluding group in period t
by t, and the total profits of unit j as an outside price taker assuming
the remaining cartel members maximize joint profits by ¶, then a system
of allocation of total cartel profits consistent with the economic power
of each member, WP t, would imply that unit j would receive the following
share of total profits:
t
wPt = j (5.37)
c
As defined in equation (5.37), the "economic power" quotas will not necess-
arily add to one. These quotas do not apply to all cartel members. They
are assumed to be administered by the dominant producer(s) as a way of
bribing non-dominant roducers to adhere to the cartel policies. The
dominant producer(s) ill thus keep the residual monopoly rent left over
after compensations have been paid. The "economic power" quotas may also
be used as a proxy for a "fair" allocation of production when side-payments
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are not feasible.
The dominant producer may also choose to invest in the cartel countries
in which the gap between the income requirements of the country and the
income from oil exports is the widest. As the foreign investment program
of the dominating producer is designed to increase cartel stability, a
foreign investment quota-system, WI, based on the difference between the
income requirements based quotas and the "economic power" based quotas has
been designed.
WIt = WF - wPt (5.38)
Under such an internal transfer of funds system, each producer country will
receive investable funds in proportion to its income requirements. Neither
the "economic power" quotas nor the investments quotas apply to all cartel
members, and neither will the consequences add to one. Both quota systems are
designed to increase the attractiveness of cartel membership to the
producers that might behave differently.
5.2.8.2 Price-Strateaies
Each cartel unit has a separate "monopoly" price, p, to prnpose as the
"optimal" cartel price, pc. The various "monopoly" prices are calculated
as was the "monopoly" price described above. Each "monopoly" price is
consequently a function of the backstop technoiogy price, PB, the residual
demand function facing the cartel, RD, he expected roduction quota, Wj,
the expected rowth rate of production, MG., the level of reserves, Rj, the3 3~~~~~~~~~
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cost conditions, MCj, the discount factor relevant to unit j, Dj, and
time, t.
t
pj = pj (PB,RD,Wj,MGj,Rj,MCj,Dj,t) (5.39)
t
The cartel price, pc' is a function of the various units' "monopoly" price.
t
= p= (Pt,. 'Pt) (5.40)
The number of possible cartel prices increases rapidly with the number
of alternative quota-systems and the number of cartel units. Even this
simplified representation of four possible quota-systems and of five cartel
units implies that fourteen different cartel prices might theoretically
emerge.
5.2.9 Uncertainty in Oligopolistic Markets
The lack of a unique solution concept in oligopolistic markets and the
resulting theoretical as well as empirical instability of such markets make
it naive to exPect the present price to be the price that will prevail in
the future. It is consequently more realistic to assume that the existing
and potential participants in an oligopolistic market will adjust their.
capital-intensive production and/or consumption equipment to some weighted
average of the prices that would emerge under the most likely market strat-
ecies to be observed. Define this weighted averace of the most likely
future prices to be the exzacted value of the istribution of future prices
?). If we further define the most likel, -future rices to be P ,n=l,...,
Ni and still let the actual price be D, then tne expected value of the
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future price distribution in period t can be defined as in the following
equation:
Et(P) = anPt + pt
n= 1 n (5.41)
N
an 
n=l
Depending on the weights, an, Et(P) can be higher, smaller, or equal to
the present price.
It was assumed above that the monopoly strategy was to equalize the
marginal revenue of the long-term residual demand function with long-term
marginal production costs. The price-term in the long-term residual
demand function was the expected price. That is, the monopolist was
charging the "optimal" expected price.
If we assume that p o Equation (5.29) is the "optimal" expected
price, and that the other price options are numbered one to six, then the
price that should be charged in period t, pt, to make the expected price
in period t, Et(P), equal to P can be found by rearranging the follow-
ing identity:
Et (P) 6 +n npn + 7P pt (5.42)
n=l
4t 6
L tp(- t7)- Onpn
pt _ n=l
p - Po
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Because of the problems involved in estimating the coefficients of
equation (5.41), the 's and the 's, we will be restricted to a set of
judgemental values for these coefficients. The price/quantity effect
of uncertainty may, however, be demonstrated through the simple procedure
outlined above.
This pricing strategy implies that the monopolist exploits the uncer-
tainty inherent in the oligopolistic market structure. The fact that non-
cartel market participants expect the cartel to fall apart or fear the
reaction of the cartel if they should adjust their capital-equipment to
the current cartel price allows the cartel to charge a higher price than
otherwise would have been the case. If the cartel should fall apart then
the other market participants might change their expected price only
slightly, which implies further "punishment" for the cartel-members in
terms of a smaller market share than would have been the case in a
deterministic and competitive world.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYTICAL UNITS, DATA, AND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
6.1 Introduction
The primary objective of this modelling eff6rt is to establish the
implications of various exporter strategies for the future price of oil
in the international market. Because of the uncertainty associated with
most econometric and engineering studies of the price-responsiveness of
oil/energy markets, the model was also designed to be able to assess the
sensitivity of the future price of oil to various coefficient or parameter
values, however estimated. The uncertainty surrounding the traditional
studies of the oil/energy markets results from the fact that the present
level of prices is far outside the range of previous experience. Rather
than allocating considerable time to determine point estimates of the
various coefficients; a model structure has been designed in which the
implications of the whole range of likely values for a given coefficient
can be assessed. To simplify the presentation of the model and its
features, a set of coefficients estimated on the basis of OECD and FEA
projections [6,8,10], as well as on the basis of the projections of other
private and public institutions have been chosen as a base case. The base
case coefficients are hence estimated from the projection made in the
above-mentioned studies rather than directly from historic observations.
The studies by OECD and FEA were designed to trace out the iimplications
for the world's energy markets of changes in the price of crude oil in
the Persian Gulf, the cartel price, which is the focus of this study.
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By assuming that the margin between the Persian Gulf price and the price
paid by the final consumer would stay constant in absolute terms at the
1972 level, the net change in the future price to the final consumer of
oil/energy resulting from a given change in the price of crude oil in
the Persian Gulf could easily be calcualted. Once the net change in the
price to the final consumer was established, the resulting net change in
quantity consumed could be established by applying the elasticity-figures
resulting from numerous studies of particular oil/energy markets. The
OECD and FEA studies are based on "what-if-a-price-of-$X-would-prevail-
up-to-1985" scenarios. Both studies disregard uncertainty. The scenarios
cover, however, a sufficiently broad range to indicate the responsiveness
of the world's oil/energy markets to changes in the price of crude oil in
the Persian Gulf. The responsiveness of the world's oil/energy markets
to the Persian Gulf price is the basis for picking the "most desirable"
price-scenarios from the exporters' point of view.
The constant mark-up assumption, or the assumption that the margin
between the price in the Persian Gulf and the price to the final consumer
will stay constant in aCsolute terms is conservative. Even if the trans-
portation costs and company profits have come down slightly, and refinery
and marketing costs have increased only modestly, the level of taxation
has changed drastically in most parts of the world since 1972 [4]. The
coefficients estimated and the results given in the following do not
include price induced consumer country energy policies and should there-
fore be regarded as indicating how markets would behave without consumer
government interference.
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Based on the forecasts of numerous public and private institutions,
estimates of the potential price-responsiveness of the competitive exporter
fringe, the non-OPEC producers and exporters, have been made. The assump-
tions underlying these estimates are made explicitly in the following. The
reasoning behind the selection of presumingly behaviorally homogenous
exporter sub-units is also made explicit, as are the assumptions underlying
the calculations of the various coefficients and parameters characterizing
the exporter sub-units.
6.2 The Consumer Regions
In the "bathtub" model the world is divided into four consumer regions.
They are Western Europe, Japan, United States, and the rest of the world
(not including USSR, Eastern Europe, and China). The linear relationships
representing the consumer regions in the "bathtub" model were estimated on
the basis of the forecasts made by OECD, FEA, and other public and private
institutions [7,8,9,10,11]. The procedure followed by these institutions
to predict the future consumption of energy is the following:
(1) Extrapolate the amount of energy spent in a base year (1972 or
1973) at the assumed rate of growth of the economy to some target year
(most often 1980 or 1985). That is, a "long-term income elasticity" of
one is implicitly assumed.
(2) Reduce the amount extrapolated to the target data by a percentage
equal to an assumed "ong-term demand elasticity" times the percentage
change in the price of energy from the base year to the target year.
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As the "long-term elasticity of demand" represents the ultimate
effect of a gradual process in which the price effect "works" itself into
the market, the above-mentioned procedure implies that the reduction in
the quantity consumed in each of the periods of adjustment to the new price
level is disregarded. If a yearly elasticity of income of one is assumed
and the growth of the economic activity is assumed to be a proxy for income
then the growth rate should be applied to the amount of energy actually
consumed in each of the adjustment years. We may define the "long-term
elasticity of demand" to be the certeris paribus, ultimate percentage
change in quantity consumed resulting from a given percentage change of
price in a perfectly deterministic world. I have defined the quantity
subject to change as the initial quantizy rather.than the target year
quantity at the initial price. This implies that the absolute number of
units of reduction will be lower than what the OECD-FEA procedure indicates.
Only in the case of no income effects are the two procedures identical. By
incorporating the income effect, the price effect, as well as the length
and distribution of the adjustment lags, the level of energy consumption
in the taraet year as well as the intermediate years can be estimated as an
explicit function of the above mentioned variables.
By defining the quantity subject to change as the initial rather than
the target year quantity at the initial price, the price-responsiveness of
demand in a linear framework is scaled down. If we assume that the initial
quantity was X, that the initial price was PO, that at the initial price
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consumption was growing at G% a year and that it has been estimated that
at a new price PT then the quantity in some target year, T year hence,
will fall to XT, then information of this estimate would imply the follow-
ing price-responsiveness, or price scope:
X0(IG) -XT (6.1)
P - PT O
When assuming the same price-responsiveness in relative terms affecting
the initial level of consumption only, that is that initial consumption
will fall to a level XpO such that
Xp0 · XT
X0 _ X0(l+ G)T
or (6.2)
XT
V _
po (1+ G)T1
Then the price-scope calculated from the absolute chances will be
smaller
XT
AO (1+ )T (6.3)
PT 'O
The price-slope (6.1) is consequently (I+G)T greater than the price-slope
(6.3). By scaling down the rice-resDonsiveness of the studies by OECD
and FEA in this way the price-responsiveness assumed in this study may be
considered to be very modest. The procedure by which the ECD and FEA
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estimates was scaled down makes it simple to understand the price-assump-
tions underlyingthe simulations reported in the following as well as to
change the price-slope assumptions for further simulations in a consistent
and readily understandable manner.
To avoid kinked demand functions and discontinuous marginal revenue
functions in a model basically designed to calculate price-paths over time
consistent with different sets of objectives of the oligopolists deminat-
ing the international petroleum market, energy demand functions, market
share functions, and functions of indigenous supplies were linearized over
the $3-$9 price range (in 1972 dollars). The price refers to the price
per barrel of oil F.O.B. the Persian Gulf.
Table 6.1 presents the coefficients of the consumer regions including
the cases in which some share of the group of exporters is included in the
indigenous supply-function of the rest of the world. The supply assump-
tions of the OPEC-members are the "optimistic set" as indicated in Table
6-7 of Section 6-4. The origin of the coefficients is. indicated in Table
6-2 summarizing the mathematical representation of the consumer regions.
The parameter values common to all the consumer regions are listed in
Table 6-3. Table 6-4 lists the assumed projections of supply of oil in
the countries included in the rest of the world's indigenous supplies.
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TABLE 6-2
REPRESENTATION OF IMPORTER REGIONS
Total demand for energy in Region i in Year t, Et (Equation 5.6):
tt t-l t-l G < k kEt = el1 + ExG - e2. 
1 i i i I k=t-K
Market share of oil in Region i in Year t, MFl (Equation 5.8):
i = MD i (1 +G )t _ M2 Z k k
k=t-K
Indigenous supplies of oil in Region i in Year t, Si (Equation 5.9):
s' = s.(1-dt)t + s2. kpk
k=t-K
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TABLE 6-3
PARAMETERS OF IMPORTER REGIONS
Length of Lag Structure: 10 years
Distribution of Lags: t 0.05 xt-l
xt-3 0.1 t-4
t-6 = 0.1 xt-7
Xt-9 = 0.15
Price of Back-stop Technology:
= 0.1
- 0.1
= 0.1
1. $15.00 - The "simple" model version
2. $16.00 - The "cartel" version
xt-2
xt-5
= 0.1
= 0.1
xt-8 = 0.1
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INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION
1973
TABLE 6-4
"REST OF THE WORLD" MMB/D
1980
$3
Trinidad & Tobago
Argentina
Bolivia
Co1 mbia
Chile
Peru
Egypt
Syria
Sinai
Turkey
Angola
Tunisia
Congo
Australia
Others & LNG
Sources: Petroleum Economist,
uourna, Various Pubi
Detroleum Encycioedia 1974, O11 & Gas
ic & Private nstitutions.
$9
0.164
0.418
0.047
0.199
0.032
0.069
0.167
0.099
0.106
0.066
0.154
0.083
0.040
0.419
0.715
2.778
0.20
0.60
0.07
0.30
0.05
0.10
0.17
0.20
0.10
0.07
0.16
0.09
0.04
0.40
0.715
3.265
C .24
C .24
0,10
0.40
0.05
0.14
0.20
0.25
0.10
0.07
0.20
O.10
0.04
0.45
0.715
3.855
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6.3 The Exporter Fringe
The existing and potential producers and exporters of the world that
are not assumed to join an international cartel agreement, and which may
become important non-cartel sources of supply, are included in a separate
unit, and the potential level of supplies of these countries, if they
would behave as price-takers, are listed in Table 6-5. Brunei-Malaysia
and Mexico might conceivably join an international cartel agreement. In
light of their recent independent behavior, a first approximation to their
future roles is independent market participants possible following non-
competitive market strategies like income or production stabilization
thereby indirectly supporting the cartel. Greece, India, and Zaire are
minors in a world context. They are included, however, because their
potential may be significantly higher than indicated in Table 6-5. The
sensitivity of the future price of oil to assumptions about the level of
supply from these sources should be assessed. Even if the Brazilian
projections may be considered high, the overall estimate of total non-OPEC
exporter supplies is in the conservative range.
6.4 OPEC Sub-Units
The above mentioned selection of consumer or importer regions follows
the traditional pattern of analysis of international markets. The composi-
tion of the exporter fringe seems plausible given the present configuration
of OPEC. The membership of OPEC is, however, very heterogenous, and depend-
ing on the set of dimensions tat are chosen to characterize the individual
member countries, very different "homocenous" units may be defined
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TABLE 6-5
PRODUCTION OF NON-OPEC EXPORTERS MMB/D
1973/74 1980
United Kingdom
Norway
Canada
China1
USSR & Eastern Europe1
0.002
0.032
1.798
0.090
0.740
$3
2.4
1 .4
2
2
0.8
$9
2.8
1.6
2.2
2.6
1
Brunei-Malaysia
Greece
Brazil
rexi co
India
0.320
0
0.169
0.7
0.06
0.75
0.465 1.5
0.148 0.2
Zaire 0
3.764
NON-OPEC EXPORT COEFFICIENTS
SO = 3.003 S2 = 0.558
0.025 0.025
11 .84 14.49
0.025 0.025
13.86 17.21
d 973-1980= -25.36
lag structure: 6 = 0 .;
d -3.71980-!985
.t-i = t- 0
= 0.2; K = 0.2
d1985-1990 = 0
-3
; o = 0.2;
t-4 = 0 2
o =0.2
includes net exoorts only.
Sources:
China roduced 0.860 MMB/D in 1973.
USSR & Eastern produces 8.389 M1i/D.
Petroleum Economist, Petroleum Encyclonedia 1974, Oil & Gas
Journal, arious Public & Private irS:iutiocns.
$3
3.5
2.2
1 .8
2
1985
$9
4
2.5
2.3
2.6
1 .4
1 0.7
0.06 0.18
1 0.75
2
1
0.18
1
2
0.20.2
1.5
0.2
0
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NOTES TO TABLE 6-6
1. End 1974 reserves in millions of barrels
Source: M.S. Crandall World Oil Study, MIT Energy Laboratory
2. Annual production divided by end 1974 reserves.
3. Assuming the export price is the relevant value of domestic
consumption and applying the population figures from the
International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1974.
A.. OPEC average
B.. Average without Nigeria and Indonesia
4. The countries that actively participated in the 1973 embargo have
been assigned an E in this column. The countries that significantly
increased production during the embargo have been assigned a N-E in
this column, and the countries that were close to neutral have not
been assigned anything.
5. PG means that the country has its most significant export terminals
in the Persian Gulf. N-PG means that important export terminals are
also located elsewhere.
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Columns one and two, "End 1974 Reserves" and "1974 Rate of Depletion,
indicate the economic power of the various countries. A low rate of de-
pletion indicates a high potential for expansion. A low rate of deple-
tion and a high reserve level imply that the potential expansion of out-
put could be substantial relative to the size of-the market, and also that
a smaller expansion could be implemented at a modest cost. The ability to
expand output at a low cost is a measure of the economic power of a produ-
cer country. The 1974 level of depletion indicates in addition to the
production history of the country also the bargaining ability and power of
the country as well as the relative emphasis on current as opposed to
future revenues. Columns three and four, "73/73% Change in Rate of Deple-
tion" and "73/74% Change in Production," indicate a country's willingness
to produce below the potential to support the price level, the responsive-
ness of a country's reserve level to an increase in the price of oil, as
well as the accomodations that will probably have to be made to keep the
cartel together. Column five, "74-Production Over End 74-Capacity" is a
proxy both for the short-term market power of the individual OPEC members,
and for the willingness and the ability of the countries to restrict
current output, as well as for the bargaining ability and bargaining power
of the member countries.
There is a number of dimensions that may be defined to characterize
the financial and political aspects of each country [2,3,5]. The finan-
cial and political aspects are for the purpose of this study, however,
summarized in two dimensions only. Column six, "74 Oil Income Per Capita"
is an indicator of the financial position of each country. Higher per
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capita oil income signifies a lower need for present versus future
revenues, a lower discount factor, higher financial reserves vis-a-vis
import requirements and a greater ability to survive production cutbacks.
As the October 1973 embargo is t only event affecting the international
petroleum market that clearly involved political considerations, the
behavior of the OPEC-membership during the embargo is used as a proxy for
the political attitude of each country and for the political homogeneity
of OEPC as a whole. Column seven, "Embargo Behavior" is an index of the
producer countries' willingness to conform to joint political actions
when there are substantial economic gains to be obtained along with the
political gains, but when the distribution of the economic gains may be
influenced by the behavior of the individual producer countries. The last
column, "Location," indicates the ease with which the price/production
policies of the membership can be supervised. The further away rom the
dominant producers of the Persian Gulf a country is located, the more
difficult it is to supervise its olicies and to detect deviations from
the joint policies, and the stronger is the incentive for the country to
cheat. "Location" is a proxy for the ease with which the quality and
transportation differentials as well as the credit terms of a country can
be supervised.
From Table 6-6 it may be arcued that OPEC consists basically of three
different member categories. A first category consists of countries that
could expand output substantial rela-ive to the size of the interna-ionai
petroleum market bu know that the , arket could acomodate their increased
output only at a lower price. This ctegory constitutes he "hard core"
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of the cartel. A second category consists of countries that are presently
producing close to their potential, and that have a strong need for
current income.' The members of this category are the "price pushers"
within the cartel. They want to continue their present rate of production
and prefer a higher to a lower price. A third category includes the
countries that have smaller reserves than the members of the cartel core,
have a strong need for current income, but are producing at a lower rate
of depletion than the "price pushers." The members of this category, the
"expansionist fringe," are small relative to the market and would like to
get a somewhat larger share of the market without having to reduce the
price. That is the "expansionist fringe " would like the other members
to accomodate them with a higher market share at the expense of these
other members.
The "hard core" of the cartel, which was denoted unit three, U3, in
Section 5.2.8, consists of the countries that have the largest recoverable
reserves of oil, produce at the lowest rate of depletion, have the highest
level of excess capacity, have the highest financial surplus level, and
have demonstrated an ability to work together within a colluding agreement.
The OPEC-countries that fit this characterization are Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait,
UAE & Qatar, and Libya.
The"price pushers" which were denoted unit two, U2, in Section 5.2.8,
consists of the countries that produce at the highest level of depletion,
have the lowest level of excess capacity, and have a strong need for
current income. Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria may be included in this
category.
-148-
The "expansionist fringe" or unit one, U1, consists of the countries
that produce at an intermediate rate of depletion, expanded production the
faster in 1973/74, have a high need for current income, did not partici-
pate in the embargo, and do not have their major export terminals in the
Persian Gulf. Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria fit the characteristics of
the "expansionist fringe."
Ecuador and Gabon are not very significant in this context. The
strong expansion of production in Gabon in 1973/74 made Gabon a candidate
for the "expansionist fringe," U1. Ecuador's level of excess capacity
was a decisive factor when including Ecuador among the "price pushers,"
U2. Gabon's ability to further expand production may be limited, and
Ecuador's level of excess capacity was not due to voluntary output reduc-
tions only, which implies that the two countries could both be accomodated
elsewhere. The results of any analysis will not be significantly affected
by such a change in status.
Even if Libya has relatively small recoverable reserves, the fact
that Libya was the price-leader of OPEC from 1970-73, participated whole-
heartedly in the embargo, and has also absorbed a significant share of
the drop in the demand for imports made Libya a candidate for the cartel
core. There is still room for considerable expansion in Iran, the level
of recoverable reserves is substantial and the present rate of depletion
is in the intermediate range. Iran did, ho:wever, expand production signi-
icantly [13] during the embargo and .,as producing close to capacity in
1974. Iran's need for current income also makes Iran less likely to play
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the role of the residual supplier with the cartel core. The size of
Iran's supplies vis-a-vis the international petroleum market makes it
unlikely that Iran would expect other OPEC members to accomodate increased
Iranian supplies, which leaves the "price pusher" role as the most likely
for Iran to play in the future as in the recent past.
Iraq's low rate of depletion, high need for current income, non-par-
ticipation in the embargo, and Mediterranean export terminals as well as
the suspicion that recoverable reserves in Iraq are twice as high as those
indicated in Table 6 are the factors that determined Iraq's membership in
the "expansionist fringe." It is considered unlikely that Iraq will be
willing to keep production at the present low level.
For the purpose of simulating the "simple" model version, the model
having one exporter group only, an "optimistic" competitive supply
function was estimated for each of the OPEC sub-units and these were then
aggregated to serve as supply-functions for the relevant coalitions of
sub-units. These supply estimates are considered optimistic because they
assume that a supply level of one-tenth of the 1974 proven recoverable
reserves could be sustained if the exporters behaved as price-takers and
the price was $9 (in 1972 dollars). A reserves to production ratio of ten
may be considered optimistic, but the assumption that the level of recover-
able reserves will not continue to increase as a result of the four-fold
increase in the price of crude oil may be considered pessimistic, as may
also the assumption that the end 1974 production capacity is a proxy for
the $3 competitive supply level. The "optimistic" case is therefore rather
modestly optimistic, even if it is more optimistic than the supply assump-
tions underlying the simulations of the "cartel" version, namely that a
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reserve to production ratio of twenty only would be sustainable at a
price of $9.
The'coefficient values of the linear supply functions of the exporter
coalitions of the "simple" model version are listed in Table 6-7. The
marginal cost functions can be found by taking the inverse of the assumed
competitive supply functions.
When estimating the competitive supply functions of the OPEC-sub-
units for the purpose of running the full cartel version of the "bathtub"
model, the end-1974 level of capacity was still assumed to be the $3
competitive supply level, but the $9 competitive supply level was assumed
to be only half the level assumed in Table 6.7 as a current recoverable
reserves to production ratio of twenty rather than of ten was assumed.
There is a bewildering number of estimates of OPEC's present level of
assets abroad and of OPEC's total imports over the last two years. To
project the income requirements of the OPEC sub-units, which are repre-
sented as a time-dependent equation only,
lt 
TRj = RO (IGt)t
where iROj is an initial constant and 1Gj is the rate of growth of OPEC-
subunit j's income requirements in year t, i974 total OPEC imports of $35
billion was assumed to be a plausible fioure. This figure was broken down
into estimates of he total imports ficures of the OPEC-subunits on the
basis of information published by the Petroleum Econom-st and First
National City Bank [1,5]. The projected total imports pa-h is used as a
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proxy for the income requirements of the OPEC countries. The coefficients
of the cartel version is listed in Table 6-8.
There is a great deal of uncertainty associated with the coefficients
listed above. Our limited experience with high-priced oil and with the
implementation of ambitious industrialization programs in the oil export-
ing countries, makes a discussion based on explicitly stated assumptions
the most ambitious analysis of what will happen in the international
petroleum market that can realistically be undertaken.
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TABLE 6-7
"OPTIMISTIC" EXPORT SUPPLIES
COALITION KEY PARAMETER VALUES
All OPEC
Countries
SO = -10.122
dt: 73-90
1R = 489 100
S2 = 15.97
0
OPEC minus
Indonesia,
SO = -10.122 S2 = 13.87
Iraq
Nigeria and
Gabon
Saudi-Arabia,
Kuwait, UAE
and Libya
dt: 73-90
R = 418 200
SO = -14,535
d t : 73-90
0
S2 = 1.57
0
= 327 000
COCi;' , ,, PAR1 A i VLIJrES
Discount Factor:
ExDected Market Growth:
No Lag Structure
'Reserve in mill ion barrels of oil
10
1
R)
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TABLE 6-8
"PESSIMISTIC" EXPORT SUPPLIES
KEY PARAMETER VALUESUNIT
U1: Iraq,
Indonesia,
Nigeria, Gabon
SO = 4.679
dt: 73-90
R1 72 700
IR02 = 5763
S2 = 0.587
0
IG1973198 = 20 IG1 9 8 0 90 = 101973-1980 1980-90
AO4 = -4400
U2: Iran, Venezuela,
Algeria, Ecuador
U 3: Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait,
URE & Qatar,
Libya
SO = 10.57
dt = 73-90
R 1 : 91 200
IRU2 = 7542
NB 3 = 1
SO = 7.675
dt: 73-90
R1: 327 000
IRO2 = 8269
NB3 = 0.5
S2 = 0.215
0
IG1 9 7 3 -1 9 8 0 = 20 IG1 9 8 0 -9 0 = 10
AO4 = -1690
S2 = 4.167
0
IG1973-90 =10
AO4 = 11800
COMMON PARAMETER VALUES
Discount Factor
Expected Market Growth
Lag Structure: o = 0 = 0.25
t-3
ot3 = 0.25
Return on Financial Assets Abroad: 5%
2Reserves in million barrels of oil
2Income requirements in million dollars
4Net back factor in dollars per barrel
1973 level of assets abroad
10%
3oc
6t-2 0.25
t-4 = 0.25
NB 3 = 1
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS OF "BATHTUB" MODEL SIMULATIONS
To illustrate the nature of the model described in Chapter 5, and how
this model combines aspects of formal modelling with informal "story-
telling" to identify the likely evolution of price and trade pattern
over time in a particular oligopolistic market, a set of "stories'; or of
simulations of the simple version and of the "cartel" version of the model
is presented. The "stories" were constructed from cartel theory, from the
empirical evidence on previous commodity cartels, and from the special
characteristics of the individual exporters.
7.1 The Simple Version
In the simple version of the "bathtub" model the world is represented
by four price-taking importer regions - Western Europe, the United States,
Japan, and the rest of the world (not including the USSR, Eastern Europe,
and China) - and one exporter unit. The simple version was designed to
assess the significance of possible coalitions of exporter countries. The
composition of the exporter coalitions can be changed by transferring
countries from the exporter unit to the unit representing the rest of the
world's indigenous suppliers, or vice versa. This version is labeled
"simple" because all the exporters in the exporter unit are assumed to
follow the same market strategy as opposed to the "cartel" version in
which the exporters may follow different market strategies.
The linear relationships of this simple version as described in
Chapter 5 were simulated with the coefficient and parameter values of
Tables 6-1, 6-3, 6-5, and 6-7 of Chapter 6. The simple version is hence
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simulated assuming the "optimistic" competitive supply response from the
OPEC countries as mentioned in the text to Table 6-7. The "optimistic"
competitive supply response implies that marginal production costs of the
OPEC countries under the various "monopoly" scenarios of the simple model
are assumed to be lower than in the case of the pessimistic" supply
response underlying the cartel model simulations.
In the "optimistic" case it was assumed that if the price of crude
oil had increased to $9 in a competitive world then the Persian Gulf
producers could have supplied a quantity equal to one tenth of the end
1974 proven recoverable reserves on an annual basis. In the "pessimistic"
case, however, it was assumed that a $9 competitive price would sustain a
level of production of only one twentieth of the end 1974 proven recover-
able reserves, once production equipment had been adjusted to that price.
That the supply response is smaller in the pessimistic case reflects the
implicit assumption that marginal production costs would rise faster in
that case. Marginal production costs in both the "optimistic" and the
"pessimistic" case, constructed such that at the 1974 level of production
marginal production costs in the model are $2.50, way above the marginal
cost figures reported elsewhere ($0.10 - $0.70). The reason is that margi-
nal production costs in this study were estimated or deducted from a hypo-
thesis of what the supply-response of the various producer countries would
be if they would leave OPEC to behave as "price-takers" rather than
directly from figures on production costs. The fact that marginal produc-
tion cost is the inverse of the competitive supply function implies that
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if the hypothesized competitive supply response to a significant price
increase is small then marginal production costs rise fast, which implies
that the slope of the linear marginal cost relationship assumed here will
be steep.
We are concerned with constructing a competitive supply/marginal cost
relationship that is a plausible approximation to the competitive supply
curve in a competitive world and to the marginal cost curve in a monopol-
istic world, because we are concerned with the implications of both modes
of behavior. The competitive supply/marginal cost relationship is common
to both modes of behavior.
The "pessimistic" case was constructed because it was hypothesized
that it would be more realistic than the "optimistic" case if some OPEC-
members should leave for the price-taking fringe. That is, the"optimistic
case implies an "unreasonably" large supply-response in the case that an
OPEC member would leave OPEC. The "pessimistic" case is a scaled-down
version of the "optimistic" case. As it would be simple to draw conclu-
sions about the impact of the two cases on the results from both model
versions, and to avoid duplication of results, the two models were being
simulated assuming a different case for the purpose of demonstrating the
nature of the models and their results.
In the tables and figures included below, some actual (in 1972
dollars) price- and quantity-scenarios (in millions of barrels per day)
resulting from simulating this simple version of the "bathtub" model are
described. The notation of these tables is identical to the notation used
above. The column headings have the following meanings:
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E - World consumption of energy
0 - World consumption of oil
D - World imports of oil
P - The price per barrel of oil in the Persian Gulf
"MOBA" is the name of the simple version. MOBA followed by a figure
indicates the number assigned to that particular simulation of "MOBA."
7.1.1 The "Bathtub" Compared to the OECD-Predictions
To make explicit the effect on world oil/energy consumption of the
more modest growth assumptions made in this study, the OECD economic
growth scenario (OECD 1974) is simulated in the $3- and $9- case. OECD
assumed in its study on future consumption of oil/energy that the U.S.
GNP would grow at a rate of 4.3% (0.043) from 1973-80 and at 4% (0.04)
from 1980-85; Western Europe would grow at a rate of 5.1%b (0.051) from
1973-80 and at 5% (0.05) from 1980-85; and Japan would grow at a rate of
8.1% (0.081) from 1973-80 and at 7.4% (0.074) from 1980-85. This high-
growth scenario was further supplemented by assuming that "the rest of the
world" would grow at a rate of 5.9% (0.059) from 1973-90. These growth
assumptions are far above those of this study as indicated in Table 6-7
above, as the more recent projections taking account of the present
recession are incorporated here.
Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1 summarize the OECD growth scenario assuming
a $3 and a $9 price per barrel of oil in the Persian Gulf. Under the cost
assumptions of the world's exporters (in this case the exporter unit is
OPEC) of Table 6-7 above, the OECD consumption and import figures in the
$3 case are not feasible. To produce the 1985-level of imports of
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73.32 MMB/D as indicated in the $3 OECD case a minimum price of $5.18
is required.
By comparing the OECD-high growth scenarios with those of Table 7-2,
in which the growth assumption of Table 6-7 have been applied, the net
effect of the different growth assumptions becomes clear. Even the "post-
recession" growth-scenario gives an infeasible imports quantity in the $3
case, in the sense that under the assumed cost conditions the imports
quantities of the 3 "post-recession" scenario from 1985 and onwards
cannot be exported at such a low price even when assuming perfect competi-
tion. A minimum price of $3.26 is required to sustain a 1985 production
of 61.23 MMB/D. In Figure 7-2 the OECD and "post-recession" scenarios
are plotted. The difference is substantial. In the S9- case OECD-growth
assumptions imply a 1990 level of OPEC- production of 66.42 MMB/D whereas
the "post-recession" growth assumptions imply a 1990 level of OPEC-
production of only 50.44 MMB/D.
The price-responsiveness of oil imports assumed in this study is a
scaled down version of the price-responsiveness estimated by OECD and FEA
as ointed out in section 6.2. in Ficure 7-2 the 1980 and 1985 projections
of demand for OPEC oil at a 9 price made by OECD1 are included. The S9
OECD level of OPEC production is 25.4 MMB/D in 1980 and 27.2 MMB/D in 1985.
Use and output of oil by centrally planned economies are assumed to net out
by 'CCD, which is more conservative assumetion than the net exports from
p. 114 Volume II, Enercy Prosnects to 1985 OECD 1974
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these countries assumed in this study, as indicated in Table 6-5. At a
$9 price Table 6-5 projects a level of net exports from centrally planned
economies of 3.6 MMB/D in 1980' and 5 MMB/D in 1985. If we add these
figures to the OECD growth scenario of Table 7-1, then the net effect of
the more modest price-responsiveness assumptions of this study appears as
(30.79 + 3.6 - 25.4) or 8.99 MMB/D in 1980 and (40.30 + 5 - 27.2) or
18.1 MMB/D in 1985. The more modest growth assumptions of this study
imply a projected reduction in consumption of oil compared to the OECD
case of 7.4 MB/D in 1980 and of 10.64 MFiIB/D in 1985, as is evident from
comparing Tables 7-1 and 7-2. The difference between the OECD projections
and the projections of this study in 1980 is due to a more modest price-
responsiveness of 8.99 MMB/D to be offset by higher net exports from the
centrally planned economies of 3.6 MB/D and more modest growth assump-
tions of 7.4 MB/D. In 1985 the difference in price-responsiveness is
18.1 MMB/D in exports, in exports from USSR and China is 5 MMB/D, and
in growth is 10.64 MMB/D.
7.1.2 OPEC Breakdown
From Table 6-6 of Chapter 6 the end-1974 production capacity of the
OPEC-countries appears as being approximately 38 MB/D. The $9 post-
recession scenario of Table 7-2 ($9 in 1972 dollars, which would be about
$11.70 in 1975 dollars), indicates that OPEC's daily production might fall
as low as 25 MB/D on an average annual basis as early as 1979. Even if
OPEC managed to keep the cartel discipline of April 1975, in which month
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TABLE 7-1
OECD ECONOIC GROWTH SCENARIO
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TABLE 7-2
"POST-RECESSION" GROWTH SCENARIO
At an'Oil Price of $9 per Barrel
At an Oil Price of 3 (MOBA43)
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the OPEC countries produced at a rate of 25,888 MMB/D1 only, no interna-
tional commodity cartel has managed to live with such a huge excess capa-
city (see Chapter 3). It may therefore be prudent to question OPEC's
ability to live with an excess capacity of about 35% of the presently
existing total productive capacity in the period from 1974 to 1985. The
fact that the OPEC-countries are still adding to the level of productive
capacity will increase the strain on cartel discipline even further.
In Table 7-3 and Figure 7-3 a scenario is therefore constructed in
which the cartel manages to keep a constant price in real terms from 1974
to 1979 and then collapses in 1979, and the static competitive price
emerges in the same year. The long adjustment period of demand accounts
for the slow pick-up of OPEC sales and production. The conservative assum-
ptions underlying the OPEC competitive supply functions account for the
apparently high price level that emerges when the cartel breaks down in
1979 in Table 7-3. The 1979 price is the long-term marginal production
cost of supplying the 1979 level of production of 26.16 MMB/D within the
OPEC countries. The price level in 1979 is equal to the long-term static
competitive price level, and the fact that marginal production costs when
producing from an already developed field are smaller than the marginal
production costs when additional capacity has to be developed to produce
an additional unit is disregarded. The cost functions of the model include
both production and development costs independently of the level of pro-
ductive capacity, which implies that the price level in the case of OPEC
1Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 5/26/75, pg. 11
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TABLE 7-3
CARTEL BREAK-DOWN IN 19 79 (MOBA44)
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OPEC - "MONOPOLY" PRICING (MOBA45)
E O D P' 7 , 71 r -T
1~, ?7.~ -7 7 7 7 7 : 3 " ^ '
, , o r ,t !. . :,
in7;~~~~ -^ '''- ·'. '"f . ' J - .' :,;'
'- 77 .]r '.- . 57 ' 7 2,,n7
1 1 t ,. -7.7 'i'_ , ); 7 3 S 
_ ,,; 1 l ] 7 . 5 8 '!~~~~~~~~~~~~~. , , .U¢ i~~1 ,r ;7  . n .7 ?
i q . . -, 1 or , .7 7, .n,- ) 7 7 r ; n (
I i ' '~ .' 7 7
17~~~~~~~ 
,,;1 1 ar;.(:77, f >. ,-i "575"7~  ~ ~~~c ;/l. nu* >7 7 ';; r5St n7 1 3.~,I 7) 7 7
1 '! ... .4
....""* "':, 4 ? i7. 5,! "'9 " ; .S. :l 1 7
-> , .· ,7' 7q!1 "'" " 'r- r,, ~c) " ' r~nr'!"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~7 "" :" '"'"
'r' 1',- '"; "'7 .... 7
, ,J' i ~
·,/o · ' · I . . · ... 41 .
.." -~ . 1; '71 9
r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! t-'"; i!:7 ',,5 ::,'7 "Ca _ 3 s'-l1" '3
C~~~~~~~~ff -C
. ,, -- 168- c- ,,
C II C'
L II II i'
II H II
II II
II IIc~~~~~~~ 11
II < II
Ln II II L~
It II
II <IIll II
II IIHI 11
t. C
* 1 II
I II
II ii
ii C II
II II
1z ,0ZI: 11 IO C=--CH . I  11
II B unH
0 ·? II II
0j ."4II II I11 11
: II II 
, II tl ·
U - ~ I! ~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I o-
: ' ii . ,, *
,"': II II o' -I 11 
0H !I It 11 tr=1 d ~ ~ ~~I I Po 0* !1t:SII II
',. II II $,.IIII _ 11 l o
° I 1
_ ?- i{ ~ w j
·= II I- .L ,~,S.B~~~~~~~~~~~I II 
· I~3 r · I C " ~ ·: 11 : *,O II
I II
II BI11 1! a,
* I ! * + 3
1 II 11 U
__ II . .t Zi ;L1 4
II ._ I t 
, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
i]~~   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ tI U
I _
f ' 'L : 
11 =3 CA2' "i 
I1 ii c
n - - - - - - - - - C~~
-169-
'I
. ,,c- II
IIC; II
11
lI
11
IIC -
· II
I-- 11
II
II
II
. ,,II
H ,C _c IIC. II
II-
co II
Hc IIr.,D
II
.- ,,
.Hct IIA, II= c' 11
o ~ "~II
I!
o ,.
0
Z Q~~~~~~~:1[- II
ItII
-. II
III!H ,! c
IIE 9 ~~~~~11
· I1
C- I t
IIIII!O ~~~- ~II11I IO :
· II
-~II
II11* :
f[
IIr- 1icL
. 11
: 1
C_
II
II CI·
I1 
II
a-: II
II
IIII *e
IW
II
II< 1
II r
II
II a
It
II
II
II
- H.
II
11
II :
:2--I
II
II r.
a-~~~~ Ii
,r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II
--C II
* C2~~~~~-
II
SI
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ II
(2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ii
C ' ( 2 ' I I
I I
I I
SI 
,-1l
Cd
0
P--
ON
0H
,a,
Hr_
Hre
H
0)
U0)
I-i
5r.
-r-
r-q
0a)
H
'IC
z
r-4(1)
QQ
a)
C)
-r-
k4
0a,
¢-)
Q0
0
-¢S
O -a:
0
_0 0
zzw o
a) H
Z H
: s
c nC
co~3
-170-
breakdown might fall even further to the marginal production costs of
producing from existing facilities.
7.1.3 OPEC "Monopoly" Prices
If OPEC would follow a joint profit maximizing strategy, the OPEC-
"monopoly" price/quantity path should emerge. In Table 7-4 and Figure
7-4 the price/quantity path of an OPEC-monopoly strategy is indicated.
The monopoly price is the higher of the static monopoly price and the
exhaustible-resource monopoly price defined in Chapter 5. Even when the
ultimate level of recoverable reserves is assumed to be equal to the end-
1974 level of recoverable reserves only, the back-stop technology price is
assumed to be $15, and the appropriate discount factor 10%, then the
exhaustible-resource monopoly price is smaller than the static monopoly
price all the way to 1986. In 1987 the exhaustible-resource monopoly
price is $0.08 higher and in 1990 $0.61 higher than the static monopoly
price. That is, the opportunity cost of oil as measured by the net present
value equivalent of the backstop price is smaller than marginal production
costs in the period from 1974 to 1986.
The OPEC-"monopoly" price of Table 7-4, the joint profit maximizing
price resulting from perfect collusion among the OPEC members is far below
the present price level. The reason for this discrepancy may be that the
OPEC-members have a different notion of what is in their best interest, or
that the bargaining power of some individual member is so strong as to
divert the joint price away from the joint profit-maximizing price to a
level consistent with profit-maximizing behavior on the part of some
individual member only.
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It may also be noted that OPEC's present price appears to be consis-
tent with exploitation of the short-term elasticity of demand, and that
the price under such an hypothesis would be expected to come down to the
longer-term monopoly level. The "bathtub" model as it stands today is
not, however, designed to identify these shorter-term aspects of a
recently monopolized market.
One purpose of the "cartel" model discussed below is to identify the
desired price- and production paths of the individual OPEC members and
thus also to reveal the extent to which the desired market solution of
some OPEC member dominates OPEC policies. However, an initial impression
of the "desires" of the individual OPEC members may be obtained also from
the simple model, as demonstrated below.
The heterogeneity of the OPEC countries implies that each member may
define a different "OPEC-monopoly price" dependent on each country's anti-
cipated share of OPEC production and on the costs of producing that share
of the total. By disregarding the regional relationships between producer
and consumer countries, and by constructing marginal cost functions for
each OPEC member consistent with Table 6-7 of Chapter 6, each OPEC
country's "OPEC-mopoly price" may be identified in the simple "bathtub"
model. The residual demand facing a country j in period t, D, as a
member of OPEC, may simply be represented as the anticipated share of
total OPEC production, Wt
t = Wt x Dt (7.1)
j J
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TABLE 7-5
The 1972 desired OPEC price in 1972 and 1975 dollars
ALGERIA
1975-dollars 9.3
VENEZUELA
10.86
OPEC
8.27
7.15 8.35 6.371972-dollars
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In Table 7-5 the desired "OPEC-monopoly price path" is indicated for
Algeria, Venezuela, and for OPEC as a whole. Algeria and Venezuela were
picked because they had the highest rate of depletion or had the lowest
reserves to production ratio as indicated in Table 6-6. A low reserves
to production ratio implies that a country is closer to its own resource
limit, and therefore may be interested in switching to the back-stop price
at an earlier date.
It was further assumed that Algeria and Venezuela would be assigned
a production quota equal to the two countries' share of OPEC's 1975 pro-
duction. The desired price of the three exporter units in 1975, in 1972
and 1975 dollars (assuming an accumulated rate of inflation since mid-
1972 of 30%) is listed in Table 7-5.
The fact that the current price is so close to Vene uela's desired
OPEC-price tends to strengthen Venezuela's image as the "expert" among
the oil producers and as an internal "price pusher." The reason for
Venezuela's higher desired price is that the end-1974 level of recoverable
reserves, which is used as a proxy for ultimate recoverable reserves, is
small compared to current production such that the opportunity cost of oil
in Venezuela as measured by the net present value of the back-stop price
is substantial. The net present value equivalent of the back-stop techno-
logy price is significantly higher than static production costs in the
Venezuelan case.
There is reason to doubt some of the OPEC-members' willingness to ad-
here to jointly determined quota policies even if OPEC were ever to be
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya as the "Monopolist" (1IOBA47)
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TABLE 7-6
OPEC SUB-UNIT "MONOPOLIES"
OPEC without Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria and Gabon (MOBA46)
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able to design and implement a pro-rationing system. If some OPEC-
countries are expected to increase production to a level such that marginal
production costs are equal to the OPEC-determined "monopoly" price rather
than stick to some "fair" market share, then these OPEC-members may be
considered as price-takers, and the relevant "monopoly" unit may be
defined to be OPEC minus these price-takers, some sub-unit of OPEC. The
simple "bathtub" model was consequently simulated assuming that two OPEC-
subunits would play the "monopoly" role.
In Table 7-6 MOBA46 describes the "monopoly" price/quantity path
resulting from throwing Indonesia, Nigeria, Iraq, and Gabon into the indi-
genous supply function of the "rest of the world," and letting the remain-
ing OPEC-countries follow a "monopoly" strategy. MOBA47 indicates the
price/quantity path resulting from letting Saudi Arabia- Kuwait, UAE, and
Libya only play the "monopoly" game, when everybody else is a price-taker.
In Figure 7-5 the price-paths resulting from the monopoly behavior of the
three units are plotted.
All OPEC countries have reduced production somewhat, but not everybody
has reduced output to the same extent, which implies that the "optimal"
price from the dominant unit's point of view should recognize "price-taker"
tendencies and would probably lie somewhere in between the price paths of
MOBA45 and MOBA46.
These simulations indicate that the present price is consistent with
an hypothesis of "price pusher" influence. As the economic sophistication
of the dominant unit (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAR, and Libya) increases over
time, a shift downwards in price may be expected even if OPEC should
survive as a colluding unit.
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7.1.4 The Effect of Uncertainty
The uncertainty associated with the future price of oil may make the
level of excess capacity associated with a market price of $9 smaller than
otherwise would have been the case. A number of private and public insti-
tutions have predicted a drop in the price of oil in the late seventies or
early eighties due to the anticipated flow of oil from non-OPEC producers
and exporters as well as the emergence of some intra-cartel competition.
The effect of expected prices different from actual prices is demonstrated
in the "bathtub" model by constructing an expected price, E(P), different
from the actual price, P. In the scenario described in Table 7-7 (MOBA48)
it is assumed that the expected price is a weighted average of the actual
price and a $6 price.
Et(P) = 0.5 x 6 + 0.5 + pt
The actual price is.kept constant at $9. The market will consequently
adjust to an expected price of $7.5. By comparing this scenario with the
$9 scenario in which actual and expected prices coincided (MOBA42), as
done in Figure 7-6, the quantity of world imports is kept at a signifi-
cantly higher level over the time-horizon of the model in the case of the
expected price being lower than the actual price. The difference in the
1974-1985 period is possibly large enough to save the cartel from collaps-
ing due to an inability to allocate the necessary reductions in output.
If OPEC should try to exploit the fact that the expected price is
different and lower than the monopoly price of the previous scenarios, the
price charged in each period would be P in Table 7-8, whereas the expected
-177-
TABLE 7-7
EXPECTED PRICE
DIFFERENT FROM ACTUAL PRICE (MOBA48)
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OPEC EXPLOITING MARKET UNCERTAINTY (MOBA49)
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price would be E(P) of Table 7-8. The expected price is as defined above
half way between $6 and the actual price. The expected price in the
monopoly case (MOBA49) is equal to the actual price in the "normal"
monopoly case (MOBA45), because under the monopoly strategies defined in
Chapter 5, the monopolist is assumed to maximize revenues with respect to
the expected price, and because the monopolist is assumed to.have perfect
information with respect to the probability distribution determining the
expected price.
The actual price of the two scenarios is plotted in Figure 7.7.
Exploiting the uncertainty as represented by the weights of the expected
price formula makes it possible for the cartel to profitably charge a
substantially higher price than a stable monopoly would have been able
to do.
7.2 The Cartel Version
From the simulations of the simple "bathtub" model, or from the
"stories" that were being told by simulating that model, some of the
critical aspects of the future international petroleum market emerge.
A most critical aspect is the extent to which the exporting countries can
agree on joint as opposed to individual strategies. The composition of the
colluding group of exporters determines directly the level of the "monopoly"
price. The uncertainty associated with the composition of and the stabil-
ity of the most likely colluding groups determine to a large extent the
response of the world's energy markets to the pricing-strategies that may
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be pursued by the various colluding groups and thereby also the "joint-
profit maximizing price" as perceived by the exporters.
To be able to focus on the likely composition of and the stability of
collusive exporter groups, it is necessary to consider the collusive
agreements from the point of view of the individual exporters. The sta-
bility of a collusive agreement depends on the desirability of the agree-
ment to the individual members. A model that can tell "stories" about the
desirability of various collusive arrangements to the individual partici-
pants is therefore needed to consider the stability question. The cartel
version of the "bathtub" model is designed to tell "stories" about the
possible reaction of individual exporter units to various collusive
arrangements. In the simple model version the.world is collapsed into two
groups of market participants, the importers and the exporters. All the
members of each group follow the same market strategy, even if the compo-
sition of the two groups can be changed to demonstrate the significance of
likely exporter coalitions. The forces working on the coalitions, or the
incentives to form coalitions, cannot be explicitly discussed within the
framework of the simple model. By dividing the world into one importer
group and four exporter units, the level of conflict within various coali-
tions of the exporter units may be explicitly discussed. The level of
conflict depends on how close the actual joint market strategy of the
colluding group is to the joint strategy considered most favourable by the
individual exporters. The level of tolerance for internal conflict
depends on the attractiveness of the individual market strategies open to
the members relative to the outcome of the actual joint market strategy.
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In the "cartel" model some joint and individual market strategies are
compared from the point of view of the individual exporters. Criteria
have been defined that indicate the attractiveness of various market strat-
egies to the exporters. By allowing non-colluding exporters to follow
non-competitive market strategies, the contribution of such individual
non-competitive strategies to the maintenance of a non-competitive price
level over time may be assessed.
In the following pages some results from simulating the cartel
model, some cartel "stories" are presented. The composition of the indi-
vidual exporter units and the reasoning behind the selection of these
units are as indicated in Section 6.4. The logic behind the form and
content of the various cartel-arrangements is indicated in Section 5.7.8.
The notation used in the following is analogous to the notation of
Chapters 5 and 6. The index of the cartel units, j, runs as follows:
j = 1 The "expansionist fringe," consisting of Iraq, Nigeria,
Indonesia, and Gabon.
j = 2 The "price pushers," consisting of Iran, Algeria, Venezuela,
and Ecuador.
j = 3 The "cartel core," consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE,
and Libya.
j = 4 All of OPEC
j = 5 OPEC without the "expansionist fringe."
SE = Supplies from the competitive exporter fringe.
Qj = Supplies from cartel unit j.
INj = Production income and financial income to cartel unit j.
3
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IRj = Income requirement of cartel unit j.
Wj = Production quota of cartel unit j.
Additional notation used to tell the various "cartel stories" will be
explained as we move along.
7.2.1 Historic Quotas
Cartel-theory cannot give us the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a cartel-dominate/narket to remain stable over time. It is possible,
however, to sumulate a cartel-dominated market, to assume a stable price,
and then to demonstrate what such a stable path would imply for each car-
tel member in terms of some critical factors. It is thereby possible to
demonstrate the minimum level of discipline each cartel member must live
with, and this may be used as a proxy for the necessary conditions for any
stable price-path to be observed.
In the simulation labeled cartel 8 (Table 7-9) some of the implica-
tions of a constant price in real terms of S9 (in 1972 dollars or approxi-
mately $11.20 in 1975 doilars) and of cartel-production being allocated
over time as it was in 1973 for each of the cartel members are discussed.
Cartel 8 is hence a breakdown of the implications of the scenario labele.d
MOBA42 in Table 7-2 for each of the exporter units, and thus analagous to
the exercise made by FEA (FEA 1974) to indicate the kind of pressure that
OPEC would have to sustain to keep a S9 price level (in 1972 dollars).
An important aspect of the pressure that will build up, is the level
of excess capacity with which the cartel will have to live. The present
level of productive capacity, approximately 38 MB/D, is far above
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expected production in the years to come. As there is no system of pro-
rationing of capacity within OPEC, and the present price level is far
above the cost of installing additional capacity in the producer countries,
the producers may be expected to increase their existing capacity. There
is, however, a number of individual and joint capacity strategies that
may be designed by the producers. To indicate the potential level of
capacity, and hence also of excess capacity, it was assumed that the
exporters will develop a level of productive capacity equal to their
supply potential in a $9 competitive world. The supply potential or the
competitive supply level given a $9 price was determined assuming the
coefficient and parameter values of Table 6-8.
In 1973 the "expansionist fringe" produced 17.4% of tbtal OPEC-
production, the "price-pushers" produced 35% of the total, and the "cartel
core" produced the remaining 47.6%. In Table 7-9 the production of the
four individual exporter units and the excess capacity of the three indi-
vidual cartel units and of OPEC as a whole are listed. It is unlikely
that the OPEC-countries will develop a production capacity equal to the
supply-potential. The level of excess capacity as defined in Table 7-9
does, however, point to an important aspect of the strain to which OPEC
might become subject.
In Table 7-10 the income associated with oil production and with
holding claims on foreign countries, the import requirements and the accu-
mulated holdings of assets abroad, of each of the individual cartel units
are listed. The projected import requirements are simply a function of
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time. The coefficients of these time-dependent functions are listed in
Table 6-8, as is also the initial level of assets abroad for each of the
cartel units. Non-petroleum exports are disregarded, which implies that
the projections made beyond 1985 are very inaccurate. It may take ten
years before non-petroleum exports become significant.
Table 7-10 is stated in constant 1972 dollars. It is implicitly
assumed that the rate of inflation of oil prices will equal the rate of
inflation of import prices to the OPEC-countries, which may tend to bias
the import-requirements downwards and the level of accumulated assets
abroad upward, as the higher rate of imports inflation may blow up the
import requirements. According to Middle East Economic Survey, the import
price index rose on the average for each OPEC-country by 26.3% in 1974 (up
from 10.3% in 1973 and 1.1% in 1972), or substantially faster than any
worldwide index of inflation that might be used as a yardstick for index-
ing of oil prices.
Even under the otimistic assumptions of this scenario, by 1990 OPEC
holdings abroad will on the average have reached the zero-level again,
even if there are substantial individual differences. As it appears from
Table 7-10, the "expansionist" fringe will run a deficit as early as 1978,
and the "price-pushers" will run a deficit already in 1980. The "cartel
core" will not run a deficit in the simulation period. From Table 7-9 it
is apparent, however, that the "cartel core" will bear most of the burden
of the excess capacity as defined above.
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There are a number of "stories" that can be told about why some
cartel member would or would not like the $9 stable price- and quota-path
described. In the following some of the "stories" we consider plausible
in terms of what we might expect the individual cartel members to suggest
as common policy and how the other cartel members might react to these
suggestions will be explored. The "stories" are put together or con-
structed on the basis of cartel theory, the empirical evidence on inter-
national commodity cartels in general, as well as on the basis of the
specific characteristics of the OPEC-countries as outlined in Section 6.4.
7.2.2 Financial Quotas
The "expansionist" fringe of OPEC, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, and
Gabon has a high need for income, and on an average per capita basis the
level of oil income is small both in absolute terms and compared to the
rest of OPEC. These countries may therefore be reluctant to accept any
reduction in output that would not instantaneously give higher export
revenues, and they may become very hard pressed economically as well as
politically when the level of income falls short of their income require-
ments as defined aDove, which might happen in early 1978 as indicated in
Table 7-10. A possible reaction given their own financial situation as
well as the financial surpluses of the "cartel core," would be to propose
a quota-system based on the income requirements of the cartel members as
defined in Section 5.2.8. Such a quota-system would significantly
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TABLE 7-10
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A $9 PRICE AND HISTORIC QUOTAS (CARTEL 8)
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increase the market-share of the "expansionist" fringe and the "price-
pushers" as can be seen from Columns Two and Four of Table 7-11. But
even such a significant increase in market share would only marginally
postpone the point in time when oil and financial income would fall short
of the rapidly increasing income requirements of these countries. The
income difference under the two scenarios is, however, substantial as
appears from Figure 7-8.
The "cartel core" is subsidizing the other cartel members under the
financial quota-scenario. The rate of depletion of the "cartel core's"
reserves drops to a level fifty percent lonwer than in the historic quota-
scenario as is indicated in Figure 7-9, even if the market share of the
"price-pushers" drops fairly rapidly after 1985 and the market shares of
the "expansionist" fringe decreases after 1986 due to capacity constraints
and an expanding market (Table 7-11). The number of periods the "cartel
core" has to wait to sell lost current output makes the net present value
of the additional future cash-flow associated with selling "oil in the
ground" so insignificant that the additional current income of the non-
core members represents an income transfer, a side-payment, from the
cartel core to the other members approximately equal in magnitude to the
net gain of the non-core members. The cartel core may be reluctant to a
subsidy that significant, which implies that the cartel core may react by
proposing an alternative price/quota system.
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7.2.3 "Price-Pusher" Dominance
If it is considered unfair to fiddle with the historic market-shares,
then the price might be used to increase the revenues of the cartel as
long as the current price is below the monopoly price. By agreeing to a
joint pricing-strategy that is "optimal" from the "low-reserve base,"
"high need for income" countries but too high for the low-cost, "exten-
sive reserve base" countries, a side-payment system across time is in
effect being implemented. If therefore the cartel core would object to a
quota-system based on income requirements, the non-core members might
propose a pricing strategy that would contain such a time-dimensional
side-payment system.
In the simulation labeled cartel 10 in Table 7-12 it was assumed that
the financial quota system would survive only for a year (1978), and that
the OPEC pricing strategy desired by the "price-pushers," Iran, Venezuela,
Algeria, and Ecuador, would be implemented in 1979 along with the historic
quotas of cartels. Even if the "optimal" 1979 price is below $9, the
"optimal" price increases fast enough to significantly alleviate the fin-
ancial problems of the non-core members as appears from comparing the
income columns of Tables 7-10 and 7-12. The pricing-strategy of Cartel .10
(Table 7-12) is incomewise more favourable to the non-core members than
the financial quota-system of cartel 9. The rate of depletion of the
cartel-core's reserves is also substantially higher under the historic
quota system than under the financial quota systems even if it is still
low, which may make the "price-pusher" strategy more acceptable to the
cartel -core.
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TABLE 7-12
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7.2.4 "Cartel Core" Dominance
It may also be assumed that the sophistication of the OPEC decision-
makers, including those of the cartel core, will increase over time, and
that such a radical proposal as the financial quota-system might trigger
an adjustment of OPEC policies to some economic realities. Such an
adjustment might, of course, take place even without any prior radical
proposals.
The economic realities may be perceived to be OPEC's monopoly position
and the economic power of the individual cartel members. OPEC may there-
fore choose to follow a joint profit-maximizing pricing-strategy, and to
allocate production and profits according to the "economic power" quotas
as defined in Sections 5.2.8 and 4.2.2. An "economic power" quota system
implies that each non-core cartel member is assigned a production quota
such that the particular member makes at least as much profit as a cartel
member as he would have made as an outside price-taker. The cartel there-
by minimizes the compensation a cartel member will want to adhere to the
policies of the cartel. The cartel core, being the dominant producer,
allocates the profits and keeps the residual rent under this scenario.
Such a scenario is simulated in Cartel 11, and some of the implica-
tions are listed in Table 7-13. It appears from Table 7-13 that the
historic quotas are not very different from the "economic power" quotas.
The "expansionist fringe" would gain some, and the "price-pushers" would
lose some compared to the historic quotas. The cartel core would conse-
quently be able to increase production only marginally compared to the
historic case.
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Both the "expansionist fringe" and the cartel core is better off
under this scenario than under the historic scenario. The "expansionist
fringe" should be close to indifferent between the "economic power"
scenario and the "price pusher" scenario as indicated by the income
columns of Tables 7-12 and 7-13. The "price pushers" are, however, worse
off in the latter than in the former case. The overall implications of
the "economic power" scenario would make it attractive to OPEC.
OPEC could, however, do a little better by allocating production and
profits as a multi-plant monopolist as defined in Section 5.2.8. Cartel 12
(Table 7-14) represents such a multi-plant monopoly scenario. A negative
financial compensation means that the production income resulting from
Unit j's allocated production is higher than Unit j's share of total car-
tel profits as determined by the "economic power" quotas. The investment
subsidy is the "cartel core's" investment in Unit j to make Unit j's
investable funds equal to a level consistent with a quota system based on
income requirements.
Under this scenario production is allocated in the most efficient
way. That is, marginal production costs are equal in all cartel units at
the allocated level of production. It is thereby possible to obtain an
efficiency premium over and above the "economic power" quota-system, as is
illustrated in Figure 7-10 in terms of the income of the cartel core in
the two cases.
The marginal cost functions of the "bathtub" model are linear. The
coefficients determining the location and slope of the marginal cost
relationships were estimated on the basis of an assumed expansion as
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indicated in Section 6.4. This implies that for the countries that could
only marginally expand production under an assumed increase in the compe-
titive price level, the marginal cost curve would be very steep. This
implies again that in the same countries the marginal costs would be
assumed to fall very rapidly if the countries should produce short of
capacity. The effect of the linear marginal cost relationships is that
countries having a steep marginal cost curve and producing short of capa-
city will be allocated a share of monopoly production that is biased
upwards. This bias explains the "price-pushers" high share of monopoly
producti on.
Linear marginal cost relationships also imply that average cost is
equal to marginal costs at a production level 50% of the current produc-
tion level, as can be seen by integrating the linear marginal cost rela-
tionship to find total costs and then by dividing by quantity to get
average cost. In the case of a negative average cost when deducted from
the linear marginal cost relationship, a kinked average cost curve was
assumed to avoid the negativity problem. A flat constant average cost
minimum was assumed up to the point where average costs consistent with
the marginal cost relationship becomes positive. Under competitive
supply assumptions the linear relationships imply that average cost is
implicitly assumed to be half the competitive price. As the average
cost of producing from existing capacity is only a fraction of the cost
of adding new capacity, which is the relevant cost concept in a competi-
tive world, the above-mentioned linear relationships will tend to bias
downwards the "economic power" quotas as defined in Sections 4.2.2 and
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5.2.8. The profits of a cartel unit as an outside price-taker will be
biased downwards.
These biases, even if substantial in the multi-plant allocation of
production case, are not considered of sufficient importance to make the
linear relationships unfit in a model intended to explore the implications
of some plausible exporter strategies. Once the implications of some
exporter strategies have been evaluated in this simplistic framework, more
sophisticated functional relationships may be introduced. Due to the com-
putational problems involved when formulating more sophisticated relation-
ships, and the resulting dramatic increase in the costs of simulating a
"bathtub"-type model, the introduction of more complex relationships is
considered to be beyond the scope of this study.
7.2.5 OPEC Cracks
None of the above-mentioned cartel-scenarios allow the expansionist
fringe to earn enough on its oil production to cover the imports bill for
the period beyond 1978. It may be politically infeasible for the "expan-
sionist fringe" to produce at a level short of full capacity when at the
same time there is a shortage of funds. The other members of OPEC may
recognize the fringe's inability to restrict production according to an
OPEC-designed quota-system, and choose a pricing strategy accordingly.
That is, the other members of OPEC recognize the "expansionist fringe's"
inability to behave differently from a price-taker. The "price-pushers"
and the cartel core may conseqeuntly try to maximize joint profits under
the assumption that the "expansionist fringe" will behave as a price-
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taker and produce at capacity. Cartel 13 (Table 7-15) consists of a scen-
ario in which the "expansionist fringe" is assumed to follow a price-taker
strategy from 1979 and beyond, and the production and profits of the mono-
poly unit, the "price pushers" and the cartel core, are allocated accord-
ing to the economic power quotas of Sections 4.2.2 and 5.2.8. The result-
ing market price in 1979 is $1.14 below the joint profit maximizing price
of OPEC as a whole, as can be seen by comparing the market price columns
of Tables 7-13 and 7-15. The 1979 income of the "price-pushers" is
approximately $27.1 billion in the joint OPEC case with "economic power"
quotas, Table 7-13, as opposed to only about $16.2 billion in the case
presented in Table 7-15 also with "economic power" quotas.
Allocating production and profits of the sub-OPEC monopoly unit as a
multi-plant monopolist would only marginally improve the income position
of the "price-pushers." The level of excess capacity of the "price-
pushers" is also high as a result of the "expansionist fringe" following
a price-taker strategy, as can be seen by comparing the 1979 figures of
production of the "price-pushers" in Tables 7-15 and 7-16. Beyond 1978
the "price-pusher" production column of Table 7-16 indicates the full
capacity of the "price-pushers." A likely response of the "price-pushers"
may therefore be to follow the example of the "expansionist fringe," and
produce at capacity as a price-taker. The immediate effect of such a
move by both the fringe and the "price-pushers" is very dramatic, as is
apparent from production figures of the "cartel core" in Table 7-16.
Table 7-16 lists some of the implications of the cartel core maximizing
profits alone. Even if the "optimal" cartel core price is substantially
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lower than the OPEC-subunit "monopoly" price of Table 7-15, the fact that
the "price pushers" can throw in a substantial level of productive capa-
city makes the 1979 income of the "price pushers" higher in the cartel-
core case than in the Cartel 13- scenario of Table 7-15. In the longer
term the income of the "price-pushers" as price-takers converges against
the income level of Table 7-15 in accordance with the definition of the
"economic power" quotas.
The dramatic effect on the production level of the cartel core might
also result in a price-war emerging. A price-war could even push the
price close to a zero level.
7.2.6 Re-establishment of OPEC
In the industries which structure is most favourable for collusive
arrangements, there has been a number of attempts to re-establish a collu-
sive agreement once an agreement has fallen apart. Chapter 3 gives ample
evidence on this aspect of "oligopolluted" industries. There have always
been considerable short-term incentives to re-establish a non-competitive
price level, even if in the longer term the non-competitive price level
often induced more entry than anticipated to the detriment of the collud-
ing firms.
Also in the case of an OPEC break-down there would be considerable
incentive to re-establish a collusive arrangement. The difference between
the income of the cartel core when maximizing profits alone (Cartel 15)
and when re-establishing OPEC (Cartel 16) is more than $35 billion in 1981.
The "price-war price" of Table 7-7 indicates the short-term market price
if all cartel members threw their full productive capacity on the market
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in any given year. Even if a negative price is not feasible, a negative
price indicates that in the case of a short-term price war, the price
could theoretically fall to a level very close to zero. If a price-war
price level rather than the long-term competitive equilibrium price level
emerged following an OPEC-breakdown, then the incentive for re-establish-
ment would be even stronger. The emergence of a long-term competitive
equilibrium price in case of OPEC breakdown is based on the assumption
that if price should fall below this level there would be a strong enough
speculative demand for oil that the price would be forced back to the
long-term competitive price level.
The confidence of the OPEC-countries in running a collusive arrange-
ment might get a serious crack in case of a break-down. Lack of confi-
dence might make future collusive arrangements even more unstable, and we
would expect to observe a fluctuating price level due to a "breakdown-
re-establishment-cycle." One such cycle is included as an illustration in
Table 7-17, the market price "cycling" from $9 in 1978 to $3.94 in 1979
and up to $9.50 in 1981.
7.2.7 Income Stabilizing Exporter Frinae and Uncertainty
Some of the governments of the countries we have assigned to the
competitive exporter fringe have expressed concern over the sheer magni-
tude of their expected oil export revenues. High export revenues may,
if they were to be absorbed immediately in the local economy, cause infla-
tion only. Production ceilings have consequently been costructed to
adjust future production to a level of income that the governments believe
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the local economies can absorb. The reasoning is thus along the lines of
the income stabilization strategy of Section 5.2.3.
The implication of a competitive exporter fringe behaving as on a
backward bending supply curve is that the monopoly unit can disregard the
exporter fringe and choose a monopoly price with respect to the demand for
world imports, Dt, which is higher than the monopoly price with respect to
world residual imports, RDt. By substituting Equation (5.12) for SEt in
Equation (5.30), and taking the first derivative of the revenue function
associated with Equation (5.30), the implication above becomes obvious,
a(RDtxp) = a((DtIt/pt)pt) (ntx pt t (Dx p t ) (7.2)
apt apt a pt apt ap
If we assume that the competitive fringe had anticipated an income level
consistent with a $9 price and production at capacity, and that they would
reduce production according to Equation (5.17) if the price moved above
this level, then OPEC could raise price almost 20% higher in the second
half of the "breakdown-re-establishment-cycle" as pointed out in Table
7-18 than othenrwise would have been the case, as indicated in Table 7-17.
The dramatic jump in demand for cartel output following the re-estab-
lishment of OPEC in 1981, the OPEC-column of Table 7-18, is caused by the
competitive fringe's reduction in output following the price increase in
the same year. The income stabilization strategy of the competitive
fringe will greatly increase the attractiveness of a joint OPEC "monopoly"
pricing strategy, increasing both the price- and production level of the
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OPEC-countries, and consequently, the income level of these countries.
If the non-cartel market participants adjust their consumption- and
production-equipment to an expected price level that is below the price
currently charged by the cartel, then such behavior will have a price
effect similar to that of an income stabilizing exporter fringe. That is,
the cartel can charge a higher price and will be able to produce a larger
quantity than otherwise would have been the case.
In Table 7-19 a scenario is listed, Cartel 19, that adds uncertainty
as defined in Section 5.2.9 to the income stabilizing case of Cartel 18
in Table 7-18. It is assumed that the expected price, E(P)t, is a weight-
ed average of the long-term competitive price, PCt, the stable price-path,
$9, the back stop technology price, $16, and the joint OPEC price p4t, and
the OPEC subunit prices of the "price-pushers" and the cartel core, p5t,
and of the "cartel core" alone, p3t , as well as the current price, pt, in
the following way;
E(p) t = O. xPCt+O.lxl6+0.lxP4t+O.lxP t+O.lxP3t+O.4xp t+ o.1 x 9
The expected price of Table 7-19 is approximately equal to the actual
price of Table 7-18, (which it is supposed to be) except for the slight
disturbance of the higher expected price in the two breakdown years. The
actual price of Table 7-19 is more than 20% higher than the actual price
of Table 7-18. The quantity of Table 7-19 is also larger than that of
Table 7-18 due to the decreased production of the income stabilizers
associated with the higher actual price.
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The tendency of some countries to behave as income stabilizers, and
the energy market participants' unwillingness to commit themselves to
capital equipment reflecting the current price may help stabilize the
OPEC cartel and also help sustain a price level even higher than the
current level.
7.3 Conclusion
7.3.1 The International Petroleum Market
The structure of the international petroleum market is oligopolistic.
The lack of a unique solution concept for oligopolistic markets makes a
bewildering number of price levels plausible outcomes of the oligopolists'
market strategies. There is no uniquely rational behavior that can be
specified for an individual ologopolist, since the most profitable behav-
ior for one seller depends on the response of the others. When the
product is relatively homogenous, as is crude oil, the demand for the
industry's product is inelastic whereas the demand for any single supplier
output is highly inelastic, as is also the case for oil , then the range
of possible price outcomes is even broader. In such a case the incentive
to organize a cartel as well as the incentive to chisel is large. But
even the most successful cartels tend not to survive for more than four
to six years.
The lack of a uniquely rational behavior for an oligopolist makes it
difficult to formulate formal models for oligopolistic markets. The
"bathtub" model is therefore a simulation model of a flexible nature. The
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form of the relationships constructed is simple enough to assure that an
analytic expression for the market equilibrating price can be deducted
under the various combinations of market strategies to be observed.
The cost conditions and the price-responsiveness assumed in this
study are "pessimistic" in the sense that they tend to bias the monopoly
or the collusive price upwards. The fact that the end 1979 proven
recoverable reserves are used as a proxy for ultimately recoverable
reserves also biases the collusive price upwards. The opportunity cost
of oil as measured by the net present value equivalent of the back-stop
technology price will thereby be biased upwards.
The major determinants of the future of the international petroleum
market, as they emerge from the "stories" told by simulating the two ver-
sions of the "bathtub" model, are the composition and the cohesiveness of
the colluding exporter group , the degree of non-price-taking behavior on
the part of the non-colluding exporters, as well as the perceived level of
uncertainty with respect to the future level of price in the Persian Gulf.
Given the theoretical and empirical instability of cartel-dominated mar-
kets, the heterogeneity of the OPEC countries, as well as the incentives
to chisel at a cartel determined price level and to establish a cartel at-
a competitive price level, the general conclusion is that the future price
of oil is likely to fluctuate, and that the magnitude of the fluctuations
will be determined by the composition of the colluding group, the degree
of non-competitive exporter behavior, and the level of uncertainty in the
market.
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The price range in any given year is likely to increase over time.
The most likely 1975-1985 price range as projected under conservative
price-responsiveness assumptions is $4 to $15 in 1972 dollars. The mean
of the distribution of expected price outcomes is in the upper half of
this range due to the considerable incentives to re-establish OPEC in the
case of a break-down.
The OPEC countries will have to learn to live with a considerable
level of excess capacity. It seems unlikely that OPEC production will
reach more than 80% of the existing capacity of J8 MMB/D in the 1980-1985
period. The lack of systems for allocating productive capacity within
OPEC may make the level of excess capacity even higher.
7.3.2 The "Bathtub" Model
The uncertainty with respect to the kind of behavior that will be
observed in the international petroleum market, and the desire to evaluate
a number of market strategies within the same model framework led to the
simple structure of the "Bathtub" model. To be able to perform a number
of experiments inexpensively, linear approximations, allowing an analytic
expression for the market clearing price to be deducted, were constructed
to the relationships we know are much more complex. As part of the National
Science Foundation project "Analysis of the World Oil Markets" more
complex relationships will be introduced in the "Bathtub" model by
attaching sub-routines to perform a piecewise linearization of the appro-
priate relationships or to solve numerically for the market clearing
price when the relationships constructed do not allow an analytic
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expression for the market clearing price to be deducted. By attaching
optimizing sub-routines more cartel strategies may also be added. The
"optimal" short-term exploitation of a newly monopolized market may be
deducted from an optimizing sub-routine. Such sub-routines seem to indi-
cate that the "optimal" price path implies a higher price in the initial
rather than in the later years. The approximations to the"long-term
monopoly price" in the "bathtub" model do not capture these short-term
aspects of monopoly-pricing. Short-term exploitation of market power will
most likely imply a higher price in the initial years and a lower price in
the later years than the "bathtub" "Monopoly" price path under the same
assumptions about the expected price.
The linearity assumed introduces biases in the calculations of the
various quota systems. A more realistic representation of production
costs would most likely increase the production share of the cartel core
in the monopoly case, and also increase the level of joint profits. The
composition of the three cartel units has been kept constant. Both the
composition of the above-mentioned three cartel units and the number of
and the characteristics of the cartel units may be changed to produce a
number of additional intra-cartel scenarios. A number of additional
"stories" may therefore be told to explore for necessary and sufficient
conditions for cartel stability.
The major consumer countries, the importer regions, were assumed to
behave as price-takers. Consumer country policies have affected the
success of international commodity cartels. By introducing traditional
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consumer-country policies like tariffs, quotas, taxes, and subsidies
some likely necessary and sufficient conditions for cartel stability may
be identified under these more complex circumstances. Such consumer
country policies will be introduced in the "bathtub" model in the imme-
diate future as part of the above-mentioned world oil project.
Even if there is ample room for improvements of the "bathtub" model
in terms of a more realistic representation of the international petro-
leum market in a world energy market context, the major determinants of
the future of the international petroleum market and the relative signifi-
cance of these determinants as identified in the existing versions of the
"bathtub" model are not expected to change. The major determinants of the
future, of the international petroleum market are the composition and the
cohesiveness of the colluding exporter group; the degree of non-price-
taking behavior on the part of the non-colluding exporters, as well as
the perceived level of uncertainty with respect to the future level of
price in the Persian Gulf.
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